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Abstract
Most social mobility studies take a two-generation perspective, in which intergenerational re-
lationships are represented by the association between parents’ and offspring’s socioeconomic
status. This approach, albeit widely adopted in the literature, has serious limitations when
more than two generations of families are considered. In particular, it ignores the role of fami-
lies’ demographic behaviors in moderating mobility outcomes and the joint role of mobility and
demography in shaping long-run family and population processes. This paper provides a demo-
graphic approach to the study of multigenerational social mobility, incorporating demographic
mechanisms of births, deaths, and mating into statistical models of social mobility. Compared
to previous mobility models for estimating the probability of offspring’s mobility conditional on
parent’s social class, the proposed joint demography-mobility model treats the number of off-
spring in various social classes as the outcome of interest. This new approach shows the extent
to which demographic processes may amplify or dampen the effects of family socioeconomic po-
sitions due to the direction and strength of the interaction between mobility and differentials in
demographic behaviors. I illustrate various demographic methods for studying multigenerational
mobility with empirical examples using the IPUMS linked historical U.S. census representative
samples (1850 to 1930), the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (1968 to 2015), and simulation
data that show other possible scenarios resulting from demography-mobility interactions.
1 INTRODUCTION
Studies on social mobility are dominated by a two-generation perspective, in which researchers
analyze the extent to which one’s socioeconomic status, in terms of education, income, occupations,
and the like, is associated with that of one’s parent (Blau and Duncan 1967; Breen 2004; Erikson
and Goldthorpe 1992; Featherman and Hauser 1978; Hout 1983). The most common method of
analysis uses mobility tables, a contingency-table technique that summarizes the probability a child
will be in a certain social position given his parent’s position (e.g., Ginsberg 1929; Glass 1954).
From a statistical view, mobility tables are equivalent to a single transition matrix of a Markov
chain, which describes the transition probability of moving from one social class to another in one
generation step (Bartholomew 1967; Hodge 1966; Prais 1955; Svalastoga 1959; White 1963).
Mobility tables provide an elegant and effective approach to summarizing the transmission of
social status across two generations, but this method’s limitations are widely discussed and debated.
Duncan (1966b: 17), for example, cautioned mobility researchers more than 50 years ago that,
What is fundamental is that the process by which occupation structures are transformed—
the succession of cohorts and intracohort net mobility—are not simply translatable into
the processes one may observe in a so-called intergenerational occupation mobility table.
Duncan did not explicitly use the phrase “demography,” but his critique points to the impor-
tance of accounting for demographic processes that govern the transmission of social status from
parents to offspring and the succession of generations in a population. More specifically, as Dun-
can (1966a) noted, the conventional mobility approach relies on a sample of respondents and their
reports of their own parents. The parents are not representative of a previous generation or any
cohort in “some definite prior moment in time” because the sample (1) necessarily excludes individ-
uals who never had children; (2) overrepresents parents who have many offspring; and (3) includes
parents born into different birth cohorts who vary by childbearing age.
From a demographic perspective, generations within families are linked not only by their so-
cioeconomic statuses but also by their fertility, mortality, and marriage, among other demographic
behaviors. These demographic outcomes, often stratified by social class, lead to variations between
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families in resources allocation, household formation, and changes in kinship structure, which, in
turn, limit and condition the amount of family capital that can be inherited by subsequent genera-
tions (see examples in Lam 1986; Mare 1997; Mare and Maralani 2006; Maralani 2013; Preston and
Campbell 1993). Compared to the traditional approach based on mobility tables, the demographic
approach provides a more complete account of intergenerational processes, shifting attention from
“how likely that offspring’s status resembles that of their parents” to “how intergenerational effects
transpire” (Mare 2015: 101). By doing so, researchers are no longer restricted to the analysis of
parents and offspring conditional on the existence of a given offspring but are now also able to
consider the degree to which offspring will come into existence as an integral part of intergenera-
tional influences (Mare and Maralani 2006). The demographic view of social mobility, albeit long
established in the literature (e.g., Matras 1961, 1967), has been largely overlooked by major studies
on social mobility until recently (Breen and Ermisch 2017; Lawrence and Breen 2016; Maralani
2013; Mare 1997; Mare and Maralani 2006).
The present study generalizes the demographic approach, which has hitherto focused on social
mobility between two generations, to multiple generations. Multigenerational mobility research has
proliferated in recent years, with new studies leveraging the increased availability of longitudinal,
genealogical, and linked administrative data that provide information on family members over three
or more generations (reviewed in Ruggles 2014; Ruggles et al. 2015; Song and Campbell 2017). Yet,
most of these studies follow the tradition of mobility tables, examining the association of social
status across three generations, especially the role of grandparents in their grandchildren’s status
attainment, net of the widely-studied effects of parents (Chan and Boliver 2013; Ferrie et al. 2016;
Jæger 2012; Mare 2011, 2014; Pfeffer 2014; Song 2016; Zeng and Xie 2014). Despite the considerable
merit of these studies, the complexity of multigenerational influences has not been fully explored.
To pass on their advantages or disadvantages, families must first have at least one offspring in each
generation who can carry the family legacy. In the long run, families’ demographic behaviors may
mute or exacerbate the effect of social mobility, leading to varying numbers and types of offspring
in families. Eventually, some families may grow and account for a disproportionately large share of
the population after several generations or hundreds of years, whereas others may decline or even
become extinct (Song, Campbell, and Lee 2015). This paper illustrates multigenerational models
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that not only account for the circulation of elites in society due to social immobility but also provide
aggregate-level inferences about long-term population renewal and change.
Building on previous theoretical constructs and contributions of social mobility and population
renewal models, I introduce several joint demography-mobility models. The models incorporate
a few new features into conventional discrete-state Markov chain mobility models (Bartholomew
1967; Blumen et al. 1955; Hodge 1966; Matras 1961; Singer and Spilerman 1973) by (1) adding
multigenerational effects; (2) combining demographic processes with the transmission of social
status; (3) addressing population heterogeneity in social mobility; (4) allowing the transition matrix
to evolve over time; and (5) differentiating between one-sex and two-sex approaches. These models
are extensions to the two-generation social reproduction model that focuses on female populations.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. In section 2, I describe traditional methods based
on discrete-time Markov chains in which time is measured as “generations” and social status is
measured by a finite number of discrete, qualitatively different categories.1 Section 3 introduces
a joint demography-mobility model, also known as the social reproduction model, which reflects
the evolution of socioeconomic distributions over generations in a population. It also provides
examples of higher-order social reproduction models that include additional parameters for ancestral
influences. Section 4 introduces various definitions of multigenerational effects based on models in
Section 3 and shows how to decompose the effects into demographic and mobility components.
Section 5 shows long-term equilibria of multigenerational social reproduction models compared to
those implied by simple Markov models. Section 6 illustrates a mixture model that allows for
heterogeneous mobility and demographic regimes among subpopulations. Section 7 describes a
two-sex version of the multigenerational social reproduction model that accounts for interactions
between males and females, namely, the process through which two sexes mate and produce offspring
with others of similar social statuses and jointly influence the social mobility outcomes of their
offspring. Section 8 provides empirical examples of various types of multigenerational mobility and
demographic models using data from the IPUMS linked representative samples of U.S. census data
1I will not discuss continuous-time Markov chain models, which require extensive information about mobility
measured in “real” time (Blumen et al. 1955; Goodman 1961; Singer and Spilerman 1976, 1977; Spilerman 1972b).
Also, this paper does not address models that rely on continuous measures of social status. These models, exemplified
by the path analysis used in Blau and Duncan (1967), often focus on answering questions related to the determinants
of social status rather than the overall extent of social mobility.
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(IPUMS linked, 1850 to 1930), the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID, 1968 to 2015), and
simulation data that show a range of hypothetical demography-mobility interactions. Section 9
concludes the paper by identifying areas for future research on multigenerational methodology.
2 CLASSICAL SOCIAL MOBILITY MODELS BASED ON MARKOV CHAINS
From the outset of studies on social mobility, important theoretical and empirical advances have ac-
companied the development of new methods of data collection, measurement, and analysis (Ganze-
boom et al. 1991; Treiman and Ganzeboom 2000). In one of the earliest studies on social mobility,
Prais (1955) showed that the Markov chain representation of mobility processes has methodolog-
ical advantages over contingency tables (e.g., Ginsberg 1929; Glass 1954). The Markov chain is a
simple form of stochastic modeling in which the outcome state of the present generation depends
only on that of the parent generation, not any other preceding generation. The model provides
new measures of mobility—such as equilibrium distribution of social classes and the average time
spent in a social class—beyond measures used in contingency tables, such as vertical and horizontal
mobility rates (Sorokin 1959 [1927]), inflow and outflow percentages (Lipset and Bendix 1959), and
mobility ratios (Carlsson 1958; Glass 1954; Rogoff 1953; Tyree 1973). These early endeavors, widely
considered to be the first generation of mobility research, all relied on descriptive, global measures
to summarize mobility patterns (Ganzeboom et al. 1991; Boudon 1973).
Below, I provide a brief overview of classic mobility models based on Markov chains. These
models typically start with a mobility table in which rows refer to fathers’ positions and columns
refer to sons’ positions (with I and J categories, respectively, and typically, I = J) (Bartholomew
1967). Mobility tables can be converted into a Markov chain transition matrix by standardizing
mobility rates between categories as follows:
J∑
j=1
pY2=j|Y1=i =
J∑
j=1
nij
ni+
= 1 (1)
where pY2=j|Y1=i denotes the probability that the son (G2) of a father (G1) in social position i ends
up in position j; nij denotes the number of father-son dyads in positions i and j; and ni+ denotes
the total number of fathers in position i regardless of their sons’ positions.
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Suppose we observe fi fathers in social position i and sj sons in position j. The transition
matrix P that transforms the distribution of fathers into the distribution of sons satisfies
sj =
I∑
i=1
fi · pY2=j|Y1=i (j = 1, 2, ..., J). (2)
In matrix notation, fathers and sons in different positions are denoted by vectors F = [f1, f2, ..., fi, ..., fn]
and S = [s1, s2, ..., si, ..., sn], respectively. The matrix of mobility probabilities P with pj|i in the
ith row and jth column is represented as a square matrix. A transition matrix has all entries as
mobility probabilities between 0 and 1. The sum of entries in each row equals 1. The matrix shows
the probability of change in social position from one generation to the next.
The matrix form of the intergenerational transmission of social classes is written as
S1×n = F1×nPn×n. (3)
Assuming mobility rates are fixed over time, we can derive the distribution of men after two
generations as
S(2) =
(
F(0) ·P
)
·P = F(0) ·P2. (4)
Furthermore, the distribution of descendants, namely the expected proportion of men in various
social positions after t generations, can be projected by taking the matrix P to the tth power,
S(t) = S(t−1) ·P = F(0) ·Pt. (5)
where F(t) and S(t) refer to the status distribution of fathers and sons in the tth generation, re-
spectively. This equation shows the process through which the initial progenitor distribution is
transformed into subsequent generations after several generations of social mobility. The process
retains no memory, in the sense that a man’s social position entirely depends on that of his father.
If the position of one’s father has been taken into account, then his grandfather, great-grandfather,
and earlier ancestors have no impact on his probability of attaining a specific position. A grand-
father who fails to transmit his position to his son is incapable of influencing the outcomes of his
grandson independently of his son. The memoryless property also makes it possible to predict how
the Markov process behaves in the long run; that is, the eventual distribution of descendants after a
5
sufficient number of generations. Provided that the transition matrix is regular, as time progresses,
the process will “forget” its initial distribution and converge to a unique equilibrium distribution of
the descendants that is unrelated to the initial distribution (Norris 1998).2 This property implies
that
lim
t→∞F
(0) ·Pt = pi (6)
where pi is called the equilibrium vector of the Markov chain. This property suggests that in the
short run, the initial distribution of progenitors influences future generations, but the influence
diminishes as time passes. In the long run, the descendant distribution is only determined by the
transition matrix P.
According to Coleman (1964a: 462), “the intent of the (Markov) model is not to mirror reality in
all its facets. It is, instead, to see just how much of reality can be mirrored by a highly constrained
process. That is, our question will be: How well does this rather restrictive assumption allow us to
account for the data on intergenerational mobility?” To evaluate the suitability of a Markov chain
model for representing a multigenerational process, it is important first to identify assumptions
implied in this model. Below, I list five key assumptions that are modified from Pullum (1975:
16–17).
Assumption 1 [No Demography]. Families’ social mobility, PY2|Y1 , is assumed to be inde-
pendent of demographic behaviors, such as mortality, fertility, adoption, mating, and migration, as
well as the timing of these events, in any generation, R. In particular, families’ social status, Y,
does not affect their number of children or long-term reproductive success.
Assumption 2 [Markov Property]. The father mediates all multigenerational influences
on his son, PYn|Y¯n−1 = PYn|Yn−1,Yn−2···Y1 = PYn|Yn−1 . The grandfather, great-grandfather, remote
ancestors, and wider kin network do not affect the son when accounting for the father’s influence.
Thus, the total influences of one’s ancestors are equal to the total influence of the father.
Assumption 3 [Homogeneous Mobility Regime]. A single mobility regime, P, in the
society is assumed, so that all individuals in a population are subject to the same set of mobility
2Regular means all entries in some power of the transition matrix are positive, or more strictly speaking, a Markov
chain is irreducible, positive recurrent, and aperiodic.
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probabilities given their fathers’ social class, pY2|Y1 . This assumption also implies that the popu-
lation is homogeneous concerning characteristics other than the measure of the social class under
consideration.
Assumption 4 [Transition Stationarity]. The intergenerational transition matrix does not
change as the history unfolds, that is, P(t) = P. All multigenerational relationships can be derived
from the time-invariant two-generation mobility table.
Assumption 5 [One-Sex Mobility]. The model includes only fathers and sons; it ignores
women’s social statuses and the potential influence of mothers and maternal ancestors, namely,
PYgn=son|Ygn−1=father = PYgn={son, daughter}|Ygn−1={father, mother} . The role of mating rules, such as as-
sortative mating according to social status in determining the number of marriages and families’
reproductive behaviors in a population, is not considered.
Mare (2011) provided examples of social contexts in which these assumptions may be violated
and discussed the implications of these violations to clarify multigenerational mechanisms. In the
following sections, I modify each of the five assumptions and show variants of stochastic models
that may better characterize multigenerational processes under different circumstances.
3 A JOINT DEMOGRAPHY-SOCIAL MOBILITY MODEL
3.1 A Two-Generation Setup
The mobility table in Markov chain models provides a straightforward way of assessing the degree
of social mobility between generations. Yet, as discussed earlier, mobility tables represent fathers’
and sons’ occupational distributions by giving equal weight to sons from families of unequal size,
ignoring the fact that some fathers may have many sons while others have none. The transmission
of social status from fathers to sons is not a simple, one-to-one mapping; instead, demographic
processes, such as births, deaths, and migrations, may all influence the number of offspring observed
in a mobility table (Kahl 1957; Pullum 1970).
Thus far, we do not have an agreed-upon solution for translating a Markov mobility model
into a model that illustrates changes in social structure and population renewal simultaneously.
Conceptually, the Markov model is flawed by the lack of a distinction between generation and birth
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cohort. If we define the son generation as a birth cohort whose occupational distribution is observed
at a recent point in time, then fathers’ occupations—represented by the marginal distribution of
the mobility table—do not comprise the occupational distribution of any birth cohort at any prior
point in time (Duncan 1966a). As fathers’ levels and timing of fertility vary, a generation of fathers
consists of a group of men whose birth years are not well-defined—and often not even reported in
retrospective surveys of sons. Such ambiguity also occurs in the definition of the sons’ birth cohort
when mobility tables are constructed from a prospective perspective (Song and Mare 2015; Yasuda
1964). Methodologically, a mobility table is not equivalent to a population projection matrix that
can be used to describe population dynamics. Mobility tables often exclude age-specific information
that could be used to predict the progression of birth cohorts. They also exclude individuals’ life
history events—such as the school-to-work transition, job promotion and changes, retirement, or
even death—that could be used to predict occupational compositions of fathers and sons in the labor
market. Despite all these potential difficulties in combining a mobility model with demographic
components, a few studies have proposed variants of Markov models that allow for differential
demographic rates (Chu and Koo 1990; Matras 1961, 1967; Mare 1997; Mare and Maralani 2006;
Maralani 2013; Preston 1974; Preston and Campbell 1993; Lam 1986, 1997). These models provide
a good starting point for future work.
To relax Assumption 1, Matras (1961) first proposed a Markov model that incorporates
differential population growth as follows:
sj =
I∑
i=1
fi · ri · pY2=j|Y1=i (j = 1, 2, ..., J). (7)
where fi denotes the number of fathers in social class i; sj denotes the number of sons in class j;
ri denotes the expected number of sons born to a man in class i who survive to adulthood or are
old enough to acquire a social position;3 and pY2=j|Y1=i denotes the probability that a son born to
a father in class i will attain class j.4
3In population data, the average number of sons who survived to adulthood may not be available. An approximate
measure is the Gross Reproduction Rate, namely, the average number of sons who would be born to a man during
his lifetime if he lives through his childbearing years and conforms to the age-specific reproduction rates of a given
year.
4Matras (1961) used the proportion of fathers (sons) in each occupation, but here we use the number of fathers
(sons) to be consistent with equation (7).
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Relying on the recursive form of the model, we can model the socioeconomic distribution of
descendants given that intergenerational fertility and mobility processes are fixed over time (namely,
a time-homogeneous Markov chain). Set a diagonal matrix for the differential fertility component,
R = [rij ], where rij = ri for i = j and rij = 0 for i 6= j. P is the same mobility matrix defined in
equation (2). Let R · P = C, and we obtain the intergenerational relationship, S(2) = S(1) ·C =
F(0) ·C2. In general, the generation-to-generation change is represented by
S(t) = F(0) ·Ct. (8)
Subsequent work has extended this basic model in several ways. Matras (1967) introduced a
model that incorporates the age structure of each generation, which was later analyzed empirically
by Lam (1986) and Mare (1997). Preston (1974) developed a model that separates white and non-
white families. Mare and his collaborators further decomposed the differential reproduction rates
into marriage, fertility, and mortality components (Kye and Mare 2012; Maralani 2013; Mare and
Maralani 2006; Maralani and Mare 2005; Mare and Song 2014).5
Overall, these models show the effect of a person’s social class in one generation on the expected
number of offspring in various social classes in the next generation; that is, the joint effects of a
man’s social class on his demographic behaviors and his offspring’s socioeconomic attainment.
Therefore, these models illustrate the transformation from F to S as a sociodemographic process
rather than strictly a social mobility process. In subsequent sections, I refer to these models as
social reproduction models or sociodemographic mobility models.
As discussed earlier, the model specified in equation (7) may simplify demographic processes
in social mobility, especially by relying on the concept of generation rather than using a real-time
scale (Duncan 1966a). Projections from the model often do not mirror observed empirical processes
that continuously evolve. Yet, taken qualitatively, conclusions from these models may still reflect
general trends in family dynamics in the long run.
5Coleman (1975) developed a Markov chain model with demography for the study of intragenerational mobility.
His model combines an intragenerational occupational mobility matrix with a birth and survival matrix to reflect the
flow of workers among occupations in a social system.
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3.2 Multigenerational Models
One central assumption of the Markov chain model is that each generation directly influences only
the immediately following generation, exerting no direct effect beyond its offspring (Assumption
2). No matter how much influence parents have on their children’s outcomes, they do not influence
their grandchildren’s outcomes independently of their own children. Therefore, the social system has
no memory: if a family loses its existing advantages, it has to start from scratch. This assumption
may be invalid under some social circumstances, such as when multigenerational social processes
are non-Markovian. In particular, individuals’ social mobility may depend on various forms of
multigenerational influence, such as direct influences from grandparents and great-grandparents,
cumulative advantages (or disadvantages) of prior generations, legacy influences of remote ancestors
who experienced extreme hardship or success, or supplementary influences of nonresident kin in
extended families (Mare 2011). Some of these processes can be represented by second- or higher-
order Markov chains (see, e.g., Goodman (1962) on attitude change and Hodge (1966) on three-
generation mobility). I will refer to them as non-Markovian generational processes.
The simplest way to relax the Markovian assumption is to incorporate the effect of grandparents
into Matras’s model shown in equation (7):
sj =
∑
i
∑
k
fik · rik · pY3=j|Y2=i,Y1=k (9)
where sj denotes the number of men in the offspring generation who are in class j (j = 1, ..., J); fik
denotes the number of men in the paternal generation who were in class i and whose fathers were
in class k; rik denotes the expected number of sons born to each man in fik; and pY3=j|Y1=i,Y2=k
denotes the probability that a son with a father in class i and a grandfather in class k will attain
class j. More generally, if the model parameters depend on the socioeconomic status of all prior
generations, Y¯n−1 = {Y1, Y2, · · · , Yn−1}, the model can be written as
sYn =
∑
Y1
· · ·
∑
Yn−1
fY¯n−1 · rY¯n−1 · pYn|Y¯n−1 (10)
Despite the importance of validating the Markovian assumption in mobility models, only a few
studies have tested the assumption empirically (Hodge 1966; Warren and Hauser 1997; see a review
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of these studies in Appendix Table S1). The increasing availability of longitudinal data in recent
years has facilitated a growing body of scholarship that investigates the Markovian assumption
more thoroughly from a wide range of countries.6 The findings from these studies are far from
conclusive, suggesting that the validity of the Markovian assumption may vary across time and
social context. Even within a society, patterns of social mobility may vary based on the form
of social status classification, be it stocks of social advantages, such as business, land, or estate
ownership, or flows of advantages, such as income, occupation, and education. Moreover, any test
of the Markovian assumption may be subject to the “lumpability” problem (Kemeny and Snell
1960: pp.123-139): a non-Markovian chain may become Markovian if we combine or divide some of
the transition states. Therefore, any conclusion regarding the mobility pattern is valid only under
the condition that the states are defined the way they are (McFarland 1970).
3.3 Demographic Change and Structural Mobility
Social mobility analyses, typically in the form of mobility tables, have a dual character: the number
of parents and offspring in different occupations reflects both the relative chances of social movement
and the changing availability of job opportunities. Most analytical techniques have focused on
separating circulation mobility, also known as exchange or relative mobility, from mobility caused
by changes in social structures. These structural changes may emerge from exogenous shocks,
such as industrialization, technological revolution, economic growth, growing new jobs, and the
increasing division of labor, which reflect the changing occupational needs of the economy. For
example, new technology reduced the number of agricultural jobs, and thus some offspring of farm
workers would be forced out of occupations in the primary industry. However, structural changes
may also result from the process of “social metabolism” produced by birth, death, migration,
and retirement from economic activities (Duncan 1966b). These fundamental demographic forces
change the supply and demand for workers in different age groups and of different qualifications,
and interact with macroeconomic changes in ways that contribute to structural change (White 1963:
6Empirical studies on Markov chain mobility have drawn on evidence from the United Kingdom (Chan and Boliver
2013), the United States (Jæger 2012; Liu 2018; Song 2016; Wightman and Danziger 2014), Germany (Hertel and
Groh-Samberg 2014), the Netherlands (Bol and Kalmijn 2016; Knigge 2016), Sweden (Ha¨llsten 2014; Ha¨llsten and
Pfeffer 2017), Denmark (Møllegaard and Jæger 2015), Finland (Erola and Moisio 2007), mainland China (Zeng and
Xie 2014), Taiwan (Chiang and Park 2015), and South Korea (Park and Kim 2019).
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p.27).7 As Watkin, Menken, and Bongaarts (1987) argue, demography is the foundation of social
change. A demographic perspective will provide insights into the amount of mobility generated by
structural change, which is often eliminated in previous mobility analyses (reviewed in, e.g., Hauser
1978).
4 SOCIAL MOBILITY EFFECT VS. DEMOGRAPHIC EFFECT
Using the models described above, we can estimate the effect of one generation on the next or
several generations later in terms of the pure mobility effect based on the classic Markov models in
equation (2) and the joint mobility and demography effect based on the social reproduction model
in equation (7). The effects can be defined either in ratio measures or difference measures. The ratio
measure refers to arithmetic quotients of mobility or demographic outcomes between two types of
families; the difference measure refers to the difference score between the two. Both measures are
widely used in social sciences (see a recent review and critique by Stolzenberg 2018). Ratio measures
are more popular in the social mobility literature, especially in mobility models based on log-linear
analysis and odds ratios (Agresti 2013; Powers and Xie 2000), whereas difference measures are
widely used in the demographic literature for decomposition analyses. This section illustrates how
to quantify various components of mobility and demography effects using the following definitions
and decomposition techniques.
4.1 Net and Total Mobility Effects
In traditional mobility models, researchers typically measure mobility by estimating differences in
the probability of children who grew up in rich versus poor families to achieve high social status.8
The total mobility effect (TME) of having a parent in high status (social class k) relative to low
status (social class j) on children’s attainment of high status can be defined using the following
7In his discussion of causes of change in social mobility, White (1963: p.27) pointed out that “such mechanisms
would have to specify the effects of variations in the prestige distribution of available jobs and in differential class
fertility on the size of Rij in fixed cells.”
8For example, Chetty et al. (2014) showed that for individuals born in 1971, the probability of reaching the top
fifth income quintile group conditional on a parent (either father or mother) being in the top quintile is 31.1%,
compared to 8.4% for individuals whose parents’ income is in the bottom quintile.
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ratio measure,
TMEP = pY2=k|Y1=k/pY2=k|Y1=j . (11)
Likewise, the total mobility probability effect of having grandparents in high status relative to low
status is estimated by combining the mobility from grandparents to parents and from parents to
offspring:
TMEGP =
∑
i
pY3=k|Y2=i,Y1=k · pY2=i|Y1=k
/∑
i
pY3=k|Y2=i,Y1=j · pY2=i|Y1=j (12)
If we remove the effect of grandparents on parents by fixing the status of the parent generation to
i, the mobility ratio represents the net mobility effect (NME) of grandparents:
NMEGP = pY3=k|Y2=i,Y1=k
/
pY3=k|Y2=i,Y1=j . (13)
The total and net effects are often unequal for the grandparent generation, but they are the same
for the parent generation by definition in equation (11).
4.2 Net and Total Social Reproduction Effects
Next, we consider the joint effects of demography and mobility on the number of offspring and
descendants in various social classes. The net Social Reproduction Effects (SRE) of parents are
defined as the effects of a targeted social class relative to a baseline class on the number of offspring
in the targeted social class. For example, the expected number of high-status individuals from
high-status rather than low-status parents is specified as:9
SREk|j =
sY2=k|Y1=k
sY2=k|Y1=j
=
fk · rk · pY2=k|Y1=k
fj · rj · pY2=k|Y1=j
. (14)
We do not differentiate between net and total SRE because they are the same by definition. If we
consider multiple generations, we define the net social reproduction effect (NSRE) of grandparents
as the comparative advantage of a low-status parent and a high-status grandparent over a low-status
9Note that in traditional mobility studies, the mobility effect is often defined in terms of odds ratios, that is
pY2=k|Y1=k/pY2=j|Y1=k
pY2=k|Y1=j/pY2=j|Y1=j
. The odds ratio measure, however, cannot reflect the demography effect if we define SRE as
=
fk·rk·pY2=k|Y1=k/fk·rk·pY2=j|Y1=k
fj ·rj ·pY2=k|Y1=j/fj ·rj ·pY2=j|Y1=j
because the reproduction parameter as a common factor is cancelled.
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parent and a low-status grandparent on producing high-status grandchildren:
NSREGPk|j =
sY3=k|Y2=j,Y1=k
sY3=k|Y2=j,Y1=j
=
fjk · rjk · pY3=k|Y2=j,Y1=k
fjj · rjj · pY3=k|Y2=j,Y1=j
. (15)
The choice of the parent’s status is, to an important extent, arbitrary. Alternatively, we can fix
the parents’ social class at k. The two NSRE definitions will lead to the same estimates if there
are no interaction effects between grandparents’ class and parents’ class in determining levels of r
and p.10
By contrast, the total social reproduction effect is the comparative advantage of a high-status
grandparent over a low-status grandparent on producing high-status grandchildren, regardless of
the parent’s social status. Specifically,
TSREGPk|j =
s
(2)
Y3=k|Y1=k
s
(2)
Y3=k|Y1=j
=
∑
i fk · rk · pY2=i|Y1=k · rik · pY3=k|Y2=i,Y1=k∑
i fj · rj · pY2=i|Y1=j · rij · pY3=k|Y2=i,Y1=j
(16)
where s
(2)
Y3=k|Y1=j (and s
(2)
Y3=k|Y1=k) refers to the number of high-status grandchildren whose grand-
parents are in low status j (and high-status k).
Note that we define the net and total effects of a prior generation based on a ratio measure,
but this tells us nothing about the absolute difference between the number of various types of
descendants from two ancestral groups of different social statuses. Revising equation (9), we can
define SRE in the parent generation as a difference measure:
SREk|j = sY2=k|Y1=k − sY2=k|Y1=j = fk · rk · pY2=k|Y1=k − fj · rj · pY2=k|Y1=j . (17)
More generally, the net SRE and total SRE of an ancestor who lives n generations back are expressed
as
NSRE
(n)
k|j = fY¯n−1,k · rY¯n−1,k · pYn=k|Y¯n−1,k − fY¯n−1,j · rY¯n−1,j · pYn=k|Y¯n−1,j (18)
TSRE
(n)
k|j =
∑
Y2
· · ·
∑
Yn−1
fk ·
n−1∏
i=1
rY¯i,k · pYi+1|Y¯i,k − fj ·
n−1∏
i=1
rY¯i,j · pYi+1|Y¯i,j . (19)
10This conclusion implies that the net social reproduction effect of grandparents can be defined as NSREGPk|j =
sY3=k|Y2=j,Y1=k
sY3=k|Y2=j,Y1=j
=
fjk·rjk·pY2=j|Y1=k
fjj ·rjj ·pY3=k|Y2=j,Y1=j
. This NSREGP will yield the same estimate as that in equation (15) if
fkk
fkj
=
fjk
fjj
= f·k
f·j ,
rkk
rkj
=
rjk
rjj
= r·k
r·j , and
pY3=k|Y2=k,Y1=k
pY3=k|Y2=k,Y1=j
=
pY3=k|Y2=j,Y1=k
pY3=k|Y2=j,Y1=j
=
pY3=k|Y1=k
pY3=k|Y1=j
.
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where Y¯i,k refers to {Yi, Yi−1 · · ·Y2, Y1 = k} in which the social status of the first generation is
fixed at Y1 = k. The net effect suggests the comparative advantage of a family with an n
th
ancestor in high status k rather than in low status j in producing high-status sons. Social statuses
of intermediate generations are fixed to be the same for these two families. By contrast, the
total effect suggests the cumulative advantage of a high-status ancestor compared to a low-status
ancestor in producing high-status descendants after n generations, regardless of the social positions
of intermediate generations. In equations (18) and (19), the position of the nth generation is fixed
at k, namely, pYn=k|Y¯n−1,k (and pYn=k|Y¯n−1,j ).
4.3 Effect Standardization and Decomposition
Based on the definition of the social reproduction effect, one may ask, “how much of the difference
in social reproduction between two families is attributable to differences in their levels of fertility
versus differences in social mobility probabilities?” This type of question is addressed through de-
composition techniques in demography (Kitagawa 1955). Below, I decompose social reproduction
effects into fertility and mobility components. The two components completely account for the
original difference without introducing a residual term. The decomposition method shows the rela-
tive importance of demographic and social pathways in explaining differences between descendants
from two ancestral groups of different social statuses.
To begin with, I use Kitagawa’s method to decompose the social reproduction effect of a high-
status parent relative to a low-status parent in equation (17).
SREk|j = sY2=k|Y1=k − sY2=k|Y1=j
= (rk − rj) ·
(pY2=k|Y1=k + pY2=k|Y1=j)
2︸ ︷︷ ︸
demography effect
+
(rk + rj)
2
· (pY2=k|Y1=k − pY2=k|Y1=j)︸ ︷︷ ︸
mobility effect
(20)
The demography effect reflects differences in SRE attributed to differences in reproduction rates
of high-status and low-status fathers, where the mobility probability of their offspring is fixed at
the mean level, p¯ =
pY2=k|Y1=k+pY2=k|Y1=j
2 ; and the mobility effect refers to differences in SRE due
to differences in mobility probabilities of offspring from high-status and low-status fathers, where
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fathers’ reproduction rates are fixed at the mean level, r¯ =
rk+rj
2 .
11
Similarly, I decompose the SRE of a high-status grandparent versus a low-status grandparent
in producing high-status grandchildren into the total effects of the grandparent via differences in
demographic rates r and differences in mobility probabilities p.
TSREGPk|j =
∑
i
rk · pY2=i|Y1=k · rik · pY3=k|Y2=i,Y1=k −
∑
i
rj · pY2=i|Y1=j · rij · pY3=k|Y2=i,Y1=j (21)
=
∑
i
(rk · rik − rj · rij) ·
(pY2=i|Y1=k · pY3=k|Y2=i,Y1=k + pY2=i|Y1=j · pY3=k|Y2=i,Y1=j)
2︸ ︷︷ ︸
demography effect
+
∑
i
(rk · rik + rj · rij)
2
· (pY2=i|Y1=k · pY3=k|Y2=i,Y1=k − pY2=i|Y1=j · pY3=k|Y2=i,Y1=j)︸ ︷︷ ︸
mobility effect
(22)
Applying Das Gupta’s decomposition method (1993) for rates of four factors, one can further
decompose compound demography and mobility effects into effects from different generations. To
simplify the notations below, I use r1 = rk, r
′
1 = rj , r2 = rik, r
′
2 = rij , p1 = pY2=i|Y1=k, p
′
1 =
pY2=i|Y1=j , p2 = pY3=k|Y2=i,Y1=k, p
′
2 = pY3=k|Y2=i,Y1=j .
demography effect (1) =
∑
Y2
[
p1r2p2 + p
′
1r
′
2p
′
2
4
+
p1r2p
′
2 + p1r
′
2p2 + p
′
1r2p2 + p
′
1r
′
2p2 + p
′
1r2p
′
2 + p1r
′
2p
′
2
12
]
· (r1 − r′1) (23)
mobility effect (1) =
∑
Y2
[
r1r2p2 + r
′
1r
′
2p
′
2
4
+
r1r2p
′
2 + r1r
′
2p2 + r
′
1r2p2 + r
′
1r
′
2p2 + r
′
1r2p
′
2 + r1r
′
2p
′
2
12
]
· (p1 − p′1) (24)
demography effect (2) =
∑
Y2
[
p1r1p2 + p
′
1r
′
1p
′
2
4
+
p1r1p
′
2 + p1r
′
1p2 + p
′
1r1p2 + p
′
1r
′
1p2 + p
′
1r1p
′
2 + p1r
′
1p
′
2
12
]
· (r2 − r′2) (25)
11Following the definitions in equation (15), the difference measure of the net social reproduction effect of grandpar-
ents can be decomposed into NSREGPk|j = (rkk−rkj) ·
(pY3=k|Y2=k,Y1=k+pY3=k|Y2=k,Y1=j)
2
+
(rkk+rkj)
2
·(pY3=k|Y2=k,Y1=k−
pY3=k|Y2=k,Y1=j).
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mobility effect (2) =
∑
Y2
[
p1r1r2 + p
′
1r
′
1r
′
2
4
+
p1r1r
′
2 + p1r
′
1r2 + p
′
1r1r2 + p
′
1r
′
1r2 + p
′
1r1r
′
2 + p1r
′
1r
′
2
12
]
· (p2 − p′2). (26)
Mobility effect (1) refers to the effect of grandparents on grandchildren via the influence of grand-
parents on parents’ social mobility. Mobility effect (2) refers to the effect of grandparents on
grandchildren via the influence of grandparents on grandchildren’s social mobility. The demogra-
phy effects (1) and (2) can be interpreted in the same vein.
A generalization of the decomposition method to n generations is discussed in Appendix C.
Note that the decomposition method assumes that families’ social mobility does not affect their
reproduction, or vice versa. If this assumption is violated, such that the level of parents’ fertility
influences the offspring’s mobility outcomes, the effects of demography and mobility cannot be
completely separated into two independent components. Instead, the decomposition results can
be roughly interpreted as the effect of differences in reproductive rates (not via mobility) and the
effect of differences in mobility rates (not via reproductive behaviors).
5 SHORT-TERM EFFECT, LONG-TERM EFFECT, AND EQUILIBRIUM
EFFECT
Based on the recursive form of the multigenerational model in equation (7), one can quantify
the relative importance of mobility and demography in shaping short-term and long-term family
inequality dynamics. The equilibrium properties of the model show the eventual population com-
position of individuals descended from different families. A critical property of the Markov model is
that if the transition matrix is time-invariant, the distribution of social classes after t generations,
that is, S(t) = F(0)Pt, will gradually converge to a stationary distribution that is determined only
by the transition matrix, not by the initial distribution of F(0).12 This property suggests that a
family’s initial social class may influence the social mobility probability for several generations,
but eventually, its influence will fade away. As such, after enough generations, the social class of
12This conclusion relies on the assumption that pij > 0, so that the Markov chain is aperiodic and has a single
recurrent class. This condition ensures that the Markov chain of the mobility process can always converge to a stable
distribution (“equilibrium”), which is independent of the initial distribution.
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a descendant will eventually become independent of the social class of the lineage founder. The
social class distribution between descendants from high-status and low-status origin lineages will
become identical. Therefore, the social advantages associated with any generation will not perma-
nently change the prospects of social attainment in future generations. Any short-term effect of
one generation does not translate into long-term inequality between families that originate from
unequal social statuses. This property is illustrated by equation (27). The long-term mobility effect
is defined as the ratio of descendants in high-status k from a high-status rather than low-status
lineage founder:
LSRE = lim
t→∞
S(t)k|k
S
(t)
k|j
 = lim
t→∞
(
F
(0)
k ·Pt
F
(0)
j ·Pt
)
=
pi
pi
= 1. (27)
where pi is the equilibrium distribution for a Markov chain with the transition matrix P. If social
mobility follows a second- or higher-order Markov process with a time-invariant transition matrix,
the LSRE will also converge to 1 in the long run. Such a conclusion, however, may not hold
when we examine the social reproduction effect rather than the mobility effect alone. Assume
S(t) = F(0) · Ct, where C = R · P, a combination of the reproduction and mobility components.
Suppose the number of social classes is the same for fathers and sons, and the reproduction and
mobility matrices have no structural 0s (i.e., pj|i > 0 and ri > 0 for all i and j). According to
the Perron-Frobenius theorem, if C is a square matrix with positive entries and a unique dominant
eigenvalue, the long-term behavior of S(t) would depend on the largest eigenvalue of C.
After enough generations, families starting with high-status k will eventually produce a1ka1j times
as many descendants in high-status k as low-status families do. The terms a1k and a1j refer to
coefficients associated with the first eigenvector when F
(0)
k and F
(0)
j are decomposed into multiple
vectors using the eigenvectors of C. A proof of this equilibrium effect is shown in Appendix D.
Therefore, the asymptotic distribution of descendants is path-dependent in that not all families
produce the same number of descendants in the long run. By contrast, regular Markov mobility
models with no demographic effects are ergodic. The transition matrix P can be viewed as a special
case of matrix C as the sum of each row is constrained to 1. This constraint also guarantees that
λ1 = 1 and a1k = a1j . As a result, the equilibrium distribution of the Markov mobility model will
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not depend on the social class of the initial generation.
6 HETEROGENEOUS MOBILITY REGIMES
The regular Markov mobility model assumes that all individuals in a population have identical tran-
sition probabilities conditional on their parents’ social status (Assumption 3). This assumption
overlooks many possible sources of heterogeneity associated with individual-level social attributes
and macro-level social structures (Blau 1977). Below, I group sources of population heterogeneity
discussed in previous mobility research into three types: (1) individual, time-invariant heterogene-
ity, (2) individual, time-dependent heterogeneity, and (3) heterogeneity in mobility regimes.
The idea of mobility heterogeneity with time-invariant properties can be traced back to Blumen
et al.’s (1955) pioneering study on intragenerational labor mobility. A similar notion can be applied
to the analysis of intergenerational mobility of family lines (e.g., White 1970). Blumen et al. (1955)
identified two types of individuals in a population: movers, who change jobs over time according
to a time-constant Markov transition matrix, and stayers, who remain in the same job category
with probability 1. The model includes the proportions of movers and stayers and the transition
probability matrix for movers. A person’s attribute—as either a mover or a stayer—does not change
during the entire period of study. The model is formulated as follows:
S = F · (Λ + (I−Λ) ·P) (28)
where S and F are social class distributions of sons and fathers, respectively; Λ is a diagonal matrix
with the proportions of stayers in each social class on the diagonals; the diagonal matrix I−Λ
includes the proportions of movers as diagonal entries; and the matrix P refers to the transition
mobility matrix for the movers. The mover-stayer model considers one of many possible types of
time-invariant heterogeneity by assuming only two distinct subpopulations. In general, individuals
may conform to miscellaneous transition probabilities, or in a more extreme scenario, each person
follows a mobility process governed by a unique set of mobility probabilities (Xie 2013).13
To model individual heterogeneity, Spilerman (1972a) proposed a Markov model that estimates
13Previous research on continuous Markov chain models also discusses heterogeneity in mobility rates versus het-
erogeneity in transition matrices (Bartholomew 1967; Spilerman 1972b).
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individual transition probabilities with regression models. We first convert the father-son transi-
tion matrix into a person-transition dataset, where each observation is represented by a possible
transition.14 For each father in social class i and son in social class j, define an indicator variable
Zij = {zY1=i,Y2=1, zY1=i,Y2=2, · · · , zY1=i,Y2=J}, which equals 1 if a person born into class i moves to
class j, and 0 otherwise. We then fit I × J (often I = J) linear probability equations, and in each
equation, Zij is predicted by a set of social attributes X.
For individual c from social class i with attributes (X1c, X2c, · · · , XV c), his probability of moving
into class j is
Pr(Zijc | Xc) = aˆij +
V∑
v=1
bˆijvXvc (29)
where aˆij and bˆijv are regression coefficient estimates.
15 If we estimate a separate transition matrix
Pc(Xc) for each person c using the predicted probabilities based on attributes Xc, intergenerational
mobility from fathers to sons can be represented in the following matrix form:
S = F ·
(
1
C
·
C∑
c=1
Pc(Xc)
)
(30)
where P(Xc) is known as the individual transition matrix (McFarland 1970; Spilerman 1972a). The
overall transition matrix is estimated from the sum of all individual transition matrices divided by
the population size C.16
The second type of heterogeneity assumes that the mobility matrix operates as a function of
time. Studies on intragenerational mobility have proposed the “Retention Model” (Henry 1971) and
the “Cornell Mobility Model” (McGinnis 1968) in which movers’ transition probability is assumed
to change over time. Below, I modify these models for the analysis of intergenerational mobility.
Stayers are defined as individuals who remain in the same occupation as their parents and movers
as those who enter an occupation different from that of their parents. These models show examples
when the stationarity assumption (Assumption 4) fails.
14Assume we have N father-son dyads in the data. To generate the indicator variable, we create J observations for
each son and the sample size becomes N × J .
15We can also use other regression models, such as logistic or probit functions, to estimate the transition probability.
16If we are only interested in the intergenerational mobility of a certain social group (e.g., non-white, Nc), the
intergenerational mobility can be represented as: S = F ·
(
N−1C ·
∑NC
c=1Pc(Xc)
)
.
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The Retention Model allows the proportion of movers and stayers in equation (28) to be time-
dependent, so the mover-stayer model becomes
S = F · (Λt + (I−Λt) ·P) (31)
where Λt is a diagonal matrix with the diagonal cells indicating the proportion of stayers in each
social class as a function of time, and P refers to the transition matrix of the movers.
The Cornell Mobility model postulates that individuals’ tendency to leave a social class declines
as a strictly monotonic function of the duration of staying in that class. In the context of inter-
generational mobility, this “cumulative inertia” property implies that the longer a family has been
in its current social class, the higher its probability of remaining there for yet another generation.
Following the notation in McGinnis (1968), let dPY2=j|Y1=i(t) refer to the transition probability
from class i to class j at generation t when a family has remained in class i for d consecutive
generations prior to generation t. The distribution of social classes in the father’s generation is
F = [1f1, 1f2, · · · , 1fI , 2f1, · · · , 2fI , df1, · · · , dfI ]. The duration-specific transition matrix can be
partitioned into the transition matrices of movers and stayers, both of which are also duration
specific:
dPY2=j|Y1=i(t) = dP
mover
Y2=j|Y1=i(t) + dP
stayer
Y2=j|Y1=i(t) (32)
The stayers’ transition matrix dP
stayer
Y2=j|Y1=i(t) is the diagonalization of dPY2=j|Y1=i(t), which satisfies
that
dP
stayer
Y2=j|Y1=i(t) =

dPY2=j|Y1=i(t) if j = i
0 otherwise
The relationship between the movers’ and stayers’ transition matrices satisfies that
dP
mover
Y2=j|Y1=i(t) = (I− dP
stayer
Y2=j|Y1=i(t)) ·R (33)
where R = [rij ] subject to rii = 0 is shown to always exist and does not vary by d. Because of the
cumulative inertia property, the model also requires that d+1P
stayer
Y2=j|Y1=i > dP
stayer
Y2=j|Y1=i.
17 Note that
17One example illustrated by McGinnis (1968) is dP
stayer = I − (1− 1
a
)d−1 (
I− 1Pstayer
)
, a > 1 and dP
mover =
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this model violates the stationarity assumption in the regular Markov model by introducing a time
component into the transition probability. It also violates the Markovian assumption by linking
individuals’ mobility outcomes with the entire history of moves in previous generations.
The third type of heterogeneity concerns the mixture of mobility regimes in a society or in
a broader stratification system created by spatial, cultural, or institutional forces of segregation.
Using occupational mobility as an example, many studies have shown variation in intergenerational
mobility among industrial societies in the mid to late 20th century (DiPrete 2002; Lipset and Bendix
1959; Featherman et al. 1975; Grusky and Hauser 1984; Erikson and Goldthorpe 1992; Xie 1992;
Yamaguchi 1987). Even within a society, several mobility regimes may coexist. One instructive
example provided by Mare (2011) postulates a stratification system consisting of three strata:
the top, middle, and bottom classes. The persistence of social status is stronger at the top and
bottom of the social hierarchy compared to the middle due to social policies and family norms that
create a cumulative advantage or disadvantage for families. In cross-country comparisons, social
boundaries among mobility regimes are often assumed to be impermeable, in contrast to within-
society comparisons in which families that start in one mobility regime may circulate in and out of
other regimes after generations of movement. These mobility processes can be represented in the
following matrix form:
S1×n = F1×n ·
(
C∑
c=1
λ(c) ·Pn×n(c)
)
(34)
where λ(c) denotes the weight of each subgroup c, λ(c) > 0,
∑
c λ(c) = 1 and P(c) denotes the
mobility probability matrix for subgroup c (c = 1, 2, ..., C). For example, Mare and Song (2014)
analyzed the social mobility of descendants from imperial and peasant families using Chinese family
genealogies and linked historical censuses (c = 1 descendants of emperors; c = 2 descendants of
peasants). If subgroups are distinct and time-invariant, then pij(c) will be fixed over generations.
If social boundaries are permeable, families’ membership c may change over time, leading to time-
varying weights λ(c, t) and mobility matrix P(c, t).
Compared to regular mobility models, mixture Markov models that account for population(
1− 1
a
)d−1
(I− dPstayer) ·R.
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heterogeneity often represent observed mobility processes better in terms of model goodness-of-
fit, such as the χ2 test (Goodman 1962). However, McFarland (1970: 475) noted about these
heterogeneous mobility models that, “any real adequate model would be too cumbersome to be
fitted to numerical data.” Mobility researchers will always face a trade-off between model accuracy
and simplicity.
7 A TWO-SEX APPROACH
Traditional social mobility studies typically take a one-sex approach by focusing exclusively on the
intergenerational association of social status between fathers and sons while ignoring the indepen-
dent role of mothers or the joint role of parents (Assumption 5). The one-sex approach is also
widely adopted in demographic models, which assume population dynamics are determined by the
vital rates of one sex only, often women, or that the roles of both sexes are identical (Caswell
2001). In multigenerational analyses, the one-sex approach is useful when the transmission of so-
cial characteristics is sex-linked or predominantly influenced by one parent. For example, in many
patriarchal societies, social positions were passed down the male lineage from paternal grandfathers
to fathers and their sons. When comparing descendants who carry sex-linked characteristics from
families of unequal origins, we only need to count male descendants in the population.
In most western societies, however, this theoretical assumption may be invalid in practice (Song
and Mare 2017). First, mothers, grandmothers, and maternal grandparents may influence individu-
als’ socioeconomic outcomes, in addition to the influences of patrilineal kin. The increasing roles of
mothers and grandmothers are associated with the rise in female labor force participation, gender
economic equality, and the growth of single-parent or skipped-generation households (e.g., Beller
2009). Second, mobility probabilities and demographic rates also vary by gender for both sociolog-
ical and biogenetic reasons (e.g., Reskin 1993; Jacobs 1989; Preston et al. 2001). If we apply the
one-sex social and demographic mobility model in equation (a.2) to men and women separately, the
results may disagree. Third, the one-sex approach does not account for interactions between men
and women through the formation of marriages, a mechanism that determines the social makeup of
families and creates the family background of the next generation (Mare and Schwartz 2006). The
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formation of marriages depends on the abundance and preferences of mates in a population. On
the one hand, the number and types of marriages are constrained by the “marriage squeeze,” or the
imbalance between the number of men and women considered marriageable (Akers 1967; Schoen
1983). The marriage squeeze may produce significant changes in the timing and patterns of mar-
riage and fertility levels in a population. On the other hand, men and women tend to marry others
with similar socioeconomic characteristics. The degree of assortative mating influences not only so-
cioeconomic resemblance between couples but also the amount of social advantage or disadvantage
transmitted to the offspring generation.
Previous demographic studies have proposed various two-sex models that account for the inter-
dependence of demographic behaviors of both sexes in determining the number of marriages and
births in a population. These models have been used to predict the size, composition, and growth of
future populations (Caswell 2001; Caswell and Weeks 1986; Goldman et al. 1984; Goodman 1953,
1968; Jenouvrier et al. 2010; Kendall 1949; Miller and Inouye 2011; Pollak 1986; Pollard 1973).
Below, I illustrate how to adapt these demographic models for multigenerational mobility research
using the Birth Matrix-Mating Rule (BMMR) model developed by Pollak (1986, 1987, 1990a,b)
as an example. In parallel to the one-sex model in equation (7), the two-sex model for men and
women is specified as
sk =
∑
i
∑
j
µij(N
m,Nf ) · rmij · pmY2=k|Y1={i,j} (35)
dk =
∑
i
∑
j
µij(N
m,Nf ) · rfij · pfY2=k|Y1={i,j} (36)
where sk (dk) denotes the number of sons (daughters) in the offspring generation who are in social
class k; µij(N
m,Nf ) denotes the number of marriages between fathers in class i and mothers in class
j;18 and rmij (r
f
ij) denotes the mean number of surviving sons (or daughters) born from each union of
class i fathers and class j mothers with completed reproduction history. In general, the differences
between rmij and r
f
ij are determined by male-to-female sex ratios at birth in a population and
18Following the tradition in the demographic literature, the number of marriages between fathers in class i and
mothers in class j is denoted as µij(N
m,Nf ) rather than µ(Nmi ,N
f
i ) because the number of marriages between men
in class i and women in class j may depend on the number of men and women in social classes other than i and j,
namely, competition among different classes.
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differential survival rates of boys and girls to adulthood. In most populations, the two estimates can
be considered equal. Finally, pmY2=k|Y1={i,j} and p
f
Y2=k|Y1={i,j} refer to the probability of obtaining
class k for sons and daughters born to class i fathers and class j mothers, respectively.
To model the mating rule term, µij(N
m,Nf ), I adopt Schoen’s harmonic mean mating rule
(Schoen 1981, 1988), which assumes that the number of marriages between two social groups
depends on the relative number of single women and men in these groups and the attractiveness of
these group members to each other. The harmonic mean mating rule specifies that
µij(N
m,Nf ) =
αijN
m
i N
f
j
Nmi + N
f
j
, αij > 0,
∑
j
αij ≤ 1,
∑
i
αij ≤ 1 (37)
where αij is the “force of attraction” between males in class i and females in class j, which results
from constraints imposed by the abundance of mates as well as preferences among all class groups
(Schoen 1988). In empirical studies, αij is often estimated from the number of marriages and single
individuals in different social classes (Qian 1998; Qian and Preston 1993; Raymo and Iwasawa
2005). Nmi is the total number of eligible men in class i, and N
f
j is the total number of eligible
women in class j.
Using the two-generation model in equations (35) and (36), we can derive the socioeconomic
distribution of the grandchild generation. Specifically, the number of granddaughters (grandsons)
in class k, denoted as d
(2)
k (s
(2)
k ), can be estimated as:
s
(2)
k =
∑
i′
∑
j′
µi′j′(S,D) · rmi′j′ · pmk|i′j′ (38)
d
(2)
k =
∑
i′
∑
j′
µi′j′(S,D) · rfi′j′ · pfk|i′j′ (39)
where the number of parents µi′j′(S,D) is generated by men in class i
′ in the father generation,
si′ , and women in class j
′ in the mother generation, dj′ . These men and women in the parent
generation can be estimated by men and women in the grandparent generation recursively.19 The
formulas above show a nonlinear, compound relationship between the distributions of grandparents
and grandchildren. Given that there is no simple analytical form of the distribution of descendants
19That is, si′ =
∑
i
∑
j µij(N
m,Nf ) · rmij · pmi′|ij and dj′ =
∑
i
∑
j µij(N
m,Nf ) · rfij · pfj′|ij . The parameters Nm and
Nf refer to the number of men and women in the grandparent generation, respectively.
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after n generations, I simulate the two-sex long-term social reproduction effect (LSRE) in the next
section and compare it with its one-sex counterpart discussed in Section 3.
In most societies, individuals tend to choose spouses with similar socioeconomic characteristics
more frequently than would be expected under random mating (Schwartz 2013). Two other mating
patterns, random mating and endogamous mating, which assume individuals either select mates
irrespective of social background or marry only within their own social classes respectively, are less
common in practice but have important theoretical implications. Formally, the random mating rule
is specified as
µij(N
m,Nf ) =
Nmi N
f
j
(Nm + Nf )/2
(40)
where Nm =
∑
i N
m
i and N
f =
∑
j N
f
j . The above equation assumes the number of marriages
between men in class i and women in class j is constrained by the abundance of both males and
females. Other possible definitions of random mating functions are described in Appendix E. For
endogamous mating, I assume marriages only happen between men and women within the same
social class and thus are constrained by the gender group with fewer members:
µij(N
m,Nf ) =

min(Nmi ,N
f
j ), if i = j
0, if i 6= j
To evaluate the role of assortative mating in multigenerational processes, I compare long-term
multigenerational social reproduction effects estimated from various two-sex mating and mobility
scenarios in the next section.
It is worth noting that although the two-sex models provide a more complete set of demographic
mechanisms compared to the one-sex models, the two-sex approach is not always preferred over the
one-sex models. The two-sex models rely on additional assumptions about mating patterns and
require data from individuals’ paternal and maternal ancestors. Such data are often not available
for some subgroups in a population (e.g., children born outside of marriage or from single-parent
families) and for ancestors beyond the grandparent generation.20 One limitation of most assortative
20The number of ancestors increases exponentially across generations. For example, individuals have two parents,
four grandparents, eight great-grandparents, and so forth. No data contain individuals’ ancestors from both paternal
and maternal sides beyond three generations.
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mating functions is that they assume no competition among different classes (“zero spillover mating
rule”) (Pollak 1990a) and thus do not provide a dynamic perspective on the formation of marriages.
Miller and Inouye (2011) provided a list of candidate two-sex mating rules and evaluate their pros
and cons using empirical data. In addition, the one-sex models are still useful when the transmission
of socioeconomic status is sex-linked. For example, in some historical populations, high social status,
religious positions, and royal titles were inherited only through male lines (Lee and Campbell 1997;
Mare and Song 2014; Goldstein 2008). The two-sex models are not simply an extension of the
one-sex models. The two approaches imply different institutional frameworks and social processes
underlying the inheritance of social status and kinship networks formed by blood and marriage.
8 ILLUSTRATIVE EXAMPLES: MULTIGENERATIONAL SOCIAL MOBIL-
ITY AND REPRODUCTION IN THE UNITED STATES
8.1 Data Description
In this section, I illustrate two-generation and three-generation mobility models, with and without
demography, using two sources of empirical data: (1) the IPUMS linked representative samples of
U.S. censuses (1850 to 1930) (Ruggles et al. 2019) and (2) the Panel Study of Income Dynamics
(1968 to 2015) (PSID Main Interview User Manual 2019). The IPUMS linked data are constructed
from linking the 1880 complete-count database to 1% samples of the 1850 to 1930 U.S. censuses of
the population. The data combine samples from seven pairs of years—1850–1880, 1860–1880, 1870–
1880, 1880–1900, 1880–1910, 1880–1920, and 1880–1930—where parents’ information is available in
the first census year and offspring’s in the second. Each year contains three independent but linked
samples: one of men, one of women, and one of married couples.21 Given that the female data
contain many missing cases in occupational variables, the following illustration focuses only on male
mobility. Occupations in the historical census data are coded using the 1950 Census occupation
classifications scheme.22
The empirical analysis also includes three-generation data from the 1968 to 2015 Panel Study
21More information about the data can be found on the IPUMS website: https://usa.ipums.org/usa/linked_
data_samples.shtml
22See the original occupation codes at the IPUMS website: https://usa.ipums.org/usa-action/variables/
OCC1950#codes_section.
27
of Income Dynamics. The PSID began in 1968 with a household sample of more than 18,000 Amer-
icans from roughly 5,000 families. Original panel members were followed each year prospectively
through 1997 and then biannually. The study follows targeted respondents according to a genealog-
ical design. All household members recruited for the PSID in 1968 carried the PSID “gene,” and
their detailed socioeconomic information was collected. Members of new households created by off-
spring of the originally targeted household heads retained the PSID “gene” themselves and became
permanent PSID respondents. The PSID Family Identification Mapping System (FIMS) provides
a tool to create multigenerational linked samples.23 I supplement the analysis with simulation data
to illustrate a wide range of scenarios that are theoretically important (e.g., perfect immobility or
random mating) but generally not observed in empirical data.
The PSID survey asked household heads and wives to report their occupations in almost every
wave of the survey. These data have been coded into detailed three-digit census categories since
1980. As a part of a retrospective project, PSID created the Retrospective Occupation-Industry
file by collecting three-digit occupation codes for the 1968 to 1980 period (Survey Research Center
1999). I merged these data with cross-year individual files. The occupational variables in the
1968 to 2001 PSID file were originally coded using Census 1970 classification codes, and those in
the 2003 to 2015 file were coded using Census 2000 classification codes. Following Hauser (1980),
I converted these three-digit occupations into five major occupational groups (upper nonmanual,
lower nonmanual, upper manual, lower manual, and farming).24 Because the longitudinal data
provide multiple-year observations of each respondent, I use the mode of the cross-year occupational
variables (i.e., the occupation that appears most often) to define a person’s working-life major
occupation.
23More information about the Family Identification Mapping System can be found on the PSID website http:
//simba.isr.umich.edu/FIMS/.
24For broad occupational groups based on the Census 1970 classification codes, I define upper nonmanual as
professional and administrative workers (codes 1/246); lower nonmanual as sales and clerical workers (codes 260/396);
upper manual as craftsmen (codes 401/696); lower manual as operatives, laborers, and service workers (codes 701/785,
901/984); and farming as farmers, farm managers, and farm laborers (codes 801/846). For broad occupational
groups based on the Census 2000 codes, upper nonmanual includes managerial and professional workers (codes
1/354); lower nonmanual includes service, clerical, and sales occupations (codes 360/593); upper manual includes
construction, extraction, maintenance, and production workers (codes 620/896); lower manual includes transportation
and material moving workers (codes 900/975); and farming includes all the farming- and fishing-related workers
(codes 600/613). The Census 1970 and 2000 occupational classifications can be found at the IPUMS website: https:
//usa.ipums.org/usa-action/variables/OCC#codes_section.
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The reproduction rates by fathers’ social class were calculated from the average number of sons
in the data. Strictly speaking, this measure is not equivalent to the typical Gross Reproduction
Rate (GRR) measure, because GRR is defined as the average number of sons who would be born to
a man during his lifetime if he lives through his childbearing years and conforms to the age-specific
reproduction rates of a given year.25 The surveys omitted sons who died during young childhood
before the next census recorded them or before they became a PSID respondent. Additionally, this
measure may have underestimated some fathers’ fertility if they were not linked to some of their
sons or if they did not live with their sons in the same household.
8.2 Empirical Results
To estimate the two-generation social reproduction model in equation (7), I first calculate transition
probabilities and GRR using the IPUMS linked historical census data and the contemporary PSID
sample. The mobility probabilities are estimated from multinomial logistic regressions shown in
Appendix Tables S1 and S3. The regression models only include fathers’ and grandfathers’ occupa-
tions as predictors. If other individual-level covariates are included, the model can be considered as
a heterogeneous mobility regime, which is discussed in Section 6.26 The GRRs are estimated from
Poisson regression models in which all fathers in each sample are treated as a synthetic cohort. For
the historical sample, over 55% (= 43,079/78,133) of fathers belonged to the farming population.
This number declined to 6% (=262/4,142) in the contemporary sample. In the late 19th and early
20th centuries, more than half of sons born into lower manual families inherited their father’s oc-
cupations, as compared to 30.1% of their counterparts in the contemporary sample. The results
of GRR show that fertility has declined over time, from more than 2.6 sons per father on average
at the beginning of the historical sample to less than 1.6 sons per father in the most recent data.
This trend is even more pronounced for farmers whose GRR decreased from 3.1 sons per father
to 1.6 sons per father. The social class gradient in fertility has also become less remarkable over
25If the sex ratio at birth is assumed at 1, GRR is approximately half of the Total Fertility Rates.
26We can further divide individuals in each cell of the mobility matrix into subgroups that vary by their character-
istics relevant for mobility and estimate the mobility probability in each cell using regression techniques (Sørensen
1975; Spilerman 1972a). For example, if demography also affects the mobility matrix, one can use a father’s number
of offspring or a son’s number of siblings to predict the effect of demography on mobility probabilities (e.g., Mare
and Song 2014).
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time. The gap in GRR between farmers and upper nonmanual workers decreased from 0.5 in the
historical sample to 0.1 in the contemporary sample.
Table 2 shows similar estimates from three-generation mobility transition matrices by taking
into account grandfathers’ occupational class. Numbers in the mobility table refer to the per-
centage of sons who would achieve a certain occupational group conditional on the father’s and
grandfather’s occupations. Numbers in the column of reproduction rates refer to the number of
sons of a father conditional on his own and his father’s occupations. These numbers are estimated
from the multinomial logistic regressions and Poission regressions shown in Tables S2 and S4 in
the appendix. In both samples, the highest GRR is observed in families in which both fathers
and grandfathers are farmers. Some estimates may not be reliable; for example, the category of
farmers with fathers in lower nonmanual occupations included only one case in the PSID sample.
For illustration purposes of the methods, I ignore such possible inaccuracies, but future research
should be cautious about fertility estimates from surveys. The models do not account for the age
structure of the population either, as age-classified models require mobility, fertility, and mortality
rates by age group and social class, but such estimates are often unreliable in surveys due to small
sample sizes. Further discussions about age-classified models are included in Appendix B.
I estimate mobility effects and social reproduction effects discussed in Sections 4.1 and 4.2 using
mobility matrices and GRRs shown in Tables 1 and 2. According to the definition in equation (11),
the mobility effect is the ratio of the probability of sons from upper nonmanual fathers to that of
sons from lower nonmanual fathers to become upper nonmanual workers. The results in Table 3
show that the mobility advantage of children born to upper nonmanual fathers relative to those
born to lower nonmanual fathers is 1.317 in the historical sample and 1.596 in the contemporary
sample. Note that the result shows only one of many possible choices of the target group (upper
nonmanual) and the baseline (lower nonmanual) group in the definitions of mobility and social
reproduction effects. The measures of social reproduction effects are defined analogously, except
that the outcome measure is the number of sons in upper nonmanual occupations rather than their
mobility probabilities (see equation (14)). Upper nonmanual fathers produced 1.456 times as many
sons in upper nonmanual occupations than did lower nonmanual fathers in the historical data. The
ratio increased to 1.622 in the contemporary sample, indicating stronger intergenerational effects
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in recent decades than in the past.
The net and total effects are, by definition, the same for the father generation, but they may
differ for the grandfather generation. The net mobility effect of grandfathers in the PSID shows
that grandchildren with both upper nonmanual grandfathers and fathers are 1.566 times more
likely to attain upper nonmanual occupations compared to grandchildren with lower nonmanual
grandfathers and fathers. By contrast, the net social reproduction effect of grandfathers shows
that upper nonmanual grandfathers and fathers produce 1.691 times as many upper nonmanual
grandchildren than do lower nonmanual grandfathers and fathers. The net effects of grandfathers
are bigger than the total effects of grandfathers because the former is estimated by assuming the
father and grandfather are in the same occupation, whereas the latter is estimated by assuming the
father’s occupation is uncontrolled. Thus, compared to the total effect, the net effect shows differ-
ences in descendants from advantaged and disadvantaged families under a more extreme condition.
Furthermore, the total mobility and social reproduction effects of grandfathers are smaller than
those of fathers because not all fathers stay in the same occupations as the grandfathers. Some
family advantages are lost during the intergenerational transmission of status, also known as the
“regression toward the mean” phenomenon.
Table 4 shows the effect decomposition based on difference measures described in Section 4.3.
The total effect of parents (or grandparents) reflects differences in the total number of sons (or
grandsons) in upper nonmanual occupations of fathers (or grandfathers) who are in upper non-
manual occupations versus lower nonmanual occupations. For example, in the historical census
data, an upper nonmanual father produces 0.253 more sons who are in upper nonmanual occupa-
tions than does a lower nonmanual father. Consistent with our ratio measures in Table 3, parent
or grandparent effects shown in the TSRE column are smaller in the contemporary data than in
the historical data. The Kitagawa decomposition shows the parts of the social reproduction effects
associated with fertility (26.7%) and mobility (73.3%). The proportion of the TSRE explained by
the fertility effect is small in the contemporary data (3.5%) because of the small difference in GRR
between men in upper and lower nonmanual occupations. As a result, the mobility effect accounts
for over 96% of the total social reproduction effect. The Das Gupta decomposition method further
partitions the total effect into the mobility and demography effect of the grandparent on the par-
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ent generation and of the grandparent on the grandchild generation net of the parent generation.
For example, the total effect of grandparents contains the effect of grandparents’ own fertility, the
effect of grandparents on parents’ fertility, the effect of grandparents on parents’ mobility, and the
effect of grandparents on grandchildren’s mobility. In the historical data, the mobility advantage
of grandchildren born to upper nonmanual grandparents relative to those born to lower nonmanual
grandparents to achieve upper nonmanual occupations themselves accounted for 41.9% of the total
social reproduction effect of grandparents. This proportion declines to 30.5% in the contemporary
data. Most interestingly, in the historical data, most influences from grandparents to grandchildren
operated through the influence of grandparents’ occupation on their own fertility (33.8%) and the
influence of grandparents’ occupation on grandchildren’s social mobility (41.9%). In the contempo-
rary data, however, most influences from grandparents to grandchildren work through the influence
of grandparents’ occupation on parents’ mobility (38.7%) and grandchildren’s mobility (30.5%).
Table 5 illustrates the long-term property of multigenerational processes described in Section 5.
The long-term SRE suggests the degree to which an individual in an upper nonmanual occupation,
compared to one in a lower nonmanual occupation, has descendants in upper nonmanual occu-
pations. In the historical sample, the effect begins with a value of 1.46 and eventually converges
to equilibrium at 1.16, rather than 1. Thus, differential reproduction rates that favor upper non-
manual men further amplify the effects of intergenerational transmission of status in the historical
sample. By contrast, in the contemporary data, an upper nonmanual man has approximately 1.02
times as many upper nonmanual descendants as his counterpart in lower nonmanual occupations in
the long run. Upper nonmanual men produce significantly more descendants in upper nonmanual
occupations in the first few generations, but this advantage gradually disappears in the long run.
This result can be explained by the fact that GRR for men in upper nonmanual occupations is only
slightly higher than that for men in lower nonmanual occupations (shown in Table 1).
The results in Tables 1–5 rely on one-sex models that account for only the male population.
As discussed earlier, the one-sex model is useful when the intergenerational transmission of social
statuses is sex-linked or identical for both sexes. Below, I describe the two-sex social reproduction
model described in Section 7. This model relies on additional assumptions about mate selection
behaviors. I first estimate assortative mating patterns using the “force of attraction,” which rep-
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resents the likelihood that men and women from different occupation groups will form unions,
sometimes known as an indicator of preferences between two occupation groups. Table 6 presents
the attraction estimates and the number of marriages between husbands and wives in different oc-
cupations in the PSID data. These numbers are observed in the first generation but are estimated
in the following generations as a function of the force of attraction using equation (37).
I estimate the number of marriages and the size of male and female populations in subsequent
generations recursively using equations (35)–(37), assuming that the force of attraction is time-
constant. The total social reproduction effects are then calculated from the combined distributions
of male and female descendants. To evaluate the effect of assortative mating on families’ social
reproduction, I compare the results from three mating rules: random mating, endogamous mating,
and assortative mating. The functions that characterize these mating rules are described in Section
7. The random mating rule assumes individuals sort into marriages irrespective of their occupational
characteristics. The number of marriages is only constrained by the abundance of eligible men and
women in each pair of occupations. The endogamous mating rule assumes men and women marry
only within their own occupation groups. The number of marriages between men and women in
different occupations is zero, and the number of marriages between men and women of the same
occupation is constrained by the group with fewer members. I also consider three mobility rules:
two-sex mobility assumes that both parents influence their offspring’s occupational attainment
equally, same-sex mobility assumes that individuals are influenced only by their same-sex parent,
and immobility assumes that sons inherit occupations from their fathers and daughters inherit
occupations from their mothers. Although some of these mating and mobility rules are unrealistic
in practice, they provide benchmarks for comparison when the roles of observed mating and mobility
patterns are evaluated.
The results in Table 7 suggest that the strongest parent effect emerges when men and women
marry within their own occupation group, and offspring inherit occupations perfectly from their
parents. The ratio measure for this scenario is undefined because it is impossible for offspring
born to lower nonmanual parents to become an upper nonmanual worker. The effect is smallest
when people mate randomly, and offspring’s mobility is influenced only by their same-sex parent.
The TSRE under assortative mating and two-sex mobility, the most common type of mating and
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mobility rules in human populations, is 0.125 based on the difference measure and 3.18 based on
the ratio measure. The results suggest that both parents in upper nonmanual occupations produce
0.125 more offspring in upper nonmanual occupations compared to parents who are both in lower
nonmanual occupations, or 3.180 times as many upper nonmanual offspring as their counterparts in
lower nonmanual occupations do. The TSRE from the two-sex model under assortative mating rules
is smaller than that from the one-sex model in Table 4 (0.125 vs. 0.215). The results imply that the
interactions between males and females in union formation and intergenerational mobility weaken
the intergenerational influences of parents on offspring and reduce inequality between families in
the number of offspring in high-status occupations.
9 CONCLUSIONS
This paper provides an integrated methodological framework that allows researchers to analyze
the combined effects of social mobility and demography in the process of multigenerational social
inequality among families. It shifts the focus from a pure probabilistic view on individuals’ mobility
probabilities to a distributional view that emphasizes the number of offspring and descendants who
vary in their social class in succeeding generations. Families who have more high-status offspring
may be different from families whose offspring have a higher probability of achieving high status
because the joint effect of fertility and mortality may operate against families’ advantages in social
mobility. The moderating effects of demographic forces often accumulate over time, as the inter-
generational reproduction of families is a dual endeavor to achieve both reproductive success and
status inheritance across generations. Table 8 summarizes statistical models used in classic mobil-
ity research and recent work that incorporates the role of demography in social mobility processes.
Building on this line of previous works, I illustrated how to define and estimate various types of
multigenerational processes and effects with and without the role of demography from both short-
and long-term perspectives. More specifically, these methodological issues include differences be-
tween two-generational and multigenerational transition matrices, net and total social reproduction
effects from one generation to succeeding generations, the effect decomposition, equilibrium states
of long-term multigenerational effects, three types of heterogeneity in multigenerational mobility,
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and two-sex versus one-sex multigenerational models and their different implications for population
dynamics. Careful and creative use of these models with appropriate multigenerational data will
advance our knowledge of family processes that were occurring in the past and help forecast trends
in the future.
Despite their advantages over conventional two-generation mobility methods based on Markov
chains, the multigenerational models proposed in this paper are far from complete. I outline several
promising directions for future research when more refined statistical and demographic techniques
are available to model the complex interactions among family members.
First, all models discussed in this paper assume a single, constant measure of socioeconomic
status for each generation, ignoring changes in parents’ status across their own and their children’s
life spans. From a life-course perspective, common indicators of social status—including education,
employment, and earnings prospects—evolve over time. Life-cycle changes in labor supply, human
capital accumulation, consumption, and nonmarket returns to education jointly shape individuals’
life trajectories and their offspring’s childhood skill formation (Heckman 1976; Heckman et al. 2013).
Ignoring parents’ and offspring’ life cycles in the estimation of intergenerational association may
lead to “life-cycle bias” (Mazumder 2005; Haider and Solon 2006). Furthermore, shared lifetimes,
namely years during which two or more generations overlap, often vary across families and may
predict the cumulative amount of influence from one generation to another (Song and Mare 2019).
The complex linkage between within-generation status changes with age and between-generation
transmission of statuses also warrants future consideration, given the growth of precarious work
and earnings instability in the U.S. labor market and elsewhere (Gottschalk et al. 1994; Kalleberg
2009). Appendix B illustrates an age-classified model that refines the social reproduction model in
equation (9) by adding age-specific fertility and mortality rates. The model can further incorporate
intragenerational status mobility if age-specific mobility rates from high-quality longitudinal data
are available (Lipset and Bendix 1952; Cheng and Song 2019).
Second, models in this paper do not address problems of causal inference, especially mech-
anisms and identification issues, in estimating the causal effects of grandparents and the other
kin. Fast-growing literature in sociology and economics points to causality as a central problem in
multigenerational research and offers various approaches to gauging biases in traditional associa-
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tion measures. Anderson et al. (2018) provided a meta-analysis of recent studies on grandparent
effects on education, showing a wide range of effect estimates that vary by social contexts, analyt-
ical methods, and the operationalization of the concept of grandparent effects. Other problems,
such as collider bias, unobserved confounders, and survivorship selection (e.g., Breen 2018; Sharkey
and Elwert 2011; Song 2016), have also appeared in studies that aim to make causal claims about
multigenerational influence using counterfactual analyses, causal graphical models, and methods
based on inverse probability treatment weighting (IPTW).
Third, models in this paper ignore the complex role of migration in shaping multigenerational
influences and population dynamics. Without migration, all changes in a closed population result
only from births and deaths, as illustrated in the social reproduction model. Yet, migration,
both internal and international, may change the composition of a population, household structure,
and relationships among extended family members in origin and destination places. Zeng and
Xie (2014) provided an example of grandparent influences in rural China with many skipped-
generation households where children are living with their grandparents while their parents leave
to work in urban areas. More work is needed to test whether and how the mobility process is
interdependent with migration, even many generations back, as well as how big events, such as
mass migration and refugee resettlement, influence social mobility of descendants of migrant and
native-born populations.
Fourth, all socioeconomic measures embrace some degree of uncertainty that may result from
random measurement errors or systematic biases. Substantive and methodological issues in the
latent structure of variables are an old topic in sociology (e.g., Coleman 1964b), but they have re-
cently been highlighted in analyses of multigenerational mobility (Solon 2018; Torche and Corvalan
2018; Clark 2014). Random noise in socioeconomic measures may lead to attenuation bias, the
classical errors-in-variables problem, which shrinks estimated intergenerational correlations toward
zero. Yet, no matter how accurately measured, indicators like income, occupation, and education
are always a proxy for the underlying concept of “social status.” Almost all methodological issues
described in this paper are still valid in models that incorporate measurement errors or a latent
structure of underlying variables. However, as Singer and Spilerman (1976: 454) noted, dealing
with the hidden structure of variables in Markov chains would lead to a considerable increase in
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complexity in both theory and methods.
All of these issues lie outside the scope of this paper, but they are central to the study of
social stratification and mobility and to a better understanding of the social mechanisms that
govern continuity and changes within families, dynasties, and populations. I leave these important
modifications and challenges to future research.
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Table 1. Two-Generation Mobility Transition Matrices and Gross Reproduction Rates
Gross Reproduction
Rate (GRR)
Historical Social Mobility
Son’s Occupation
Father’s Occupation 1 2 3 4 5 Total N
1. Upper nonmanual 2.6 31.1 32.2 8.0 20.9 7.8 100.0 8,564
2. Lower nonmanual 2.4 23.6 44.9 8.8 17.7 5.0 100.0 3,575
3. Upper manual 2.6 10.0 21.6 24.1 36.4 7.9 100.0 9,609
4. Lower manual 2.6 7.7 15.8 9.8 58.6 8.1 100.0 13,306
5. Farming 3.1 7.0 2.9 2.4 9.2 78.5 100.0 43,079
N 8,514 9,806 5,656 17,684 36,473 78,133
Gross Reproduction
Rate (GRR)
Contemporary Social Mobility from PSID
Son’s Occupation
Father’s Occupation 1 2 3 4 5 Total N
1. Upper nonmanual 1.5 38.5 22.5 22.5 14.9 1.5 100.0 910
2. Lower nonmanual 1.4 24.1 28.8 26.2 20.3 0.6 100.0 473
3. Upper manual 1.4 16.7 21.5 38.6 22.2 1.0 100.0 1,473
4. Lower manual 1.4 12.7 22.0 33.2 30.1 2.1 100.0 1,024
5. Farming 1.6 13.4 10.7 37.8 20.2 17.9 100.0 262
N 875 911 1,337 920 99 4,142
Source: IPUMS Linked Representative Samples, 1850–1930 (final data release June 2010); Panel Study of Income Dynamics,
1968–2015.
Notes: The two-generation transition matrices show percentages converted from mobility probabilities, e.g., pY2=j|Y1=i; namely,
the son of a father in social position i ends up in position j (see equation (1)).
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Table 2. Three-Generation Mobility Transition Matrices and Gross Reproduction Rates
Gross
Reproduction
Rate (GRR)
Historical Social Mobility
Son’s Occupation
Grandfather’s Occupation Father’s Occupation 1 2 3 4 5 Total N
1. Upper nonmanual 1. Upper nonmanual 2.5 37.6 34.1 7.4 16.1 4.7 100.0 3,204
2. Lower nonmanual 2.3 28.9 46.5 8.0 13.4 3.2 100.0 934
3. Upper manual 2.5 16.3 27.2 21.6 29.5 5.3 100.0 660
4. Lower manual 2.5 13.8 21.6 10.9 48.0 5.7 100.0 753
5. Farming 2.8 17.5 6.2 4.6 12.0 59.7 100.0 1,034
N 1,869 1,934 585 1,322 875 6,585
2. Lower nonmanual 1. Upper nonmanual 2.4 33.6 37.0 7.9 17.6 3.9 100.0 403
2. Lower nonmanual 2.2 25.3 49.5 8.4 14.3 2.6 100.0 637
3. Upper manual 2.4 14.0 28.4 22.3 31.1 4.2 100.0 156
4. Lower manual 2.3 11.8 22.4 11.2 50.1 4.5 100.0 228
5. Farming 2.6 17.4 7.6 5.5 14.6 54.9 100.0 150
N 371 571 154 347 131 1,574
3. Upper manual 1. Upper nonmanual 2.5 25.8 32.3 12.2 22.7 7.0 100.0 1,135
2. Lower nonmanual 2.3 19.7 43.8 13.1 18.7 4.7 100.0 451
3. Upper manual 2.5 9.1 21.1 29.2 34.1 6.5 100.0 4,648
4. Lower manual 2.5 7.6 16.5 14.5 54.5 6.8 100.0 2,051
5. Farming 2.8 9.2 4.5 5.8 12.9 67.7 100.0 1,573
N 1,107 1,954 1,944 3,248 1,605 9,858
4. Lower manual 1. Upper nonmanual 2.6 23.6 32.2 8.6 29.1 6.5 100.0 1,142
2. Lower nonmanual 2.4 18.1 44.0 9.4 24.1 4.4 100.0 591
3. Upper manual 2.6 8.4 21.1 20.7 43.8 6.0 100.0 1,797
4. Lower manual 2.5 6.4 15.0 9.3 63.6 5.7 100.0 6,056
5. Farming 2.8 8.7 4.7 4.3 17.2 65.1 100.0 2,596
N 1,139 2,038 1,202 5,557 2,246 12,182
5. Farming 1. Upper nonmanual 2.8 28.2 29.3 6.7 22.9 12.9 100.0 2,680
2. Lower nonmanual 2.6 22.5 41.4 7.5 19.7 9.0 100.0 962
3. Upper manual 2.8 10.9 20.9 17.4 37.7 13.0 100.0 2,348
4. Lower manual 2.8 8.5 15.1 8.0 55.7 12.7 100.0 4,218
5. Farming 3.1 6.5 2.6 2.0 8.4 80.4 100.0 37,726
N 4,028 3,309 1,771 7,210 31,616 47,934
Gross
Reproduction
Rate (GRR)
Contemporary Social Mobility from PSID
Son’s Occupation
Grandfather’s Occupation Father’s Occupation 1 2 3 4 5 Total N
1. Upper nonmanual 1. Upper nonmanual 1.4 48.1 22.5 17.7 10.6 1.1 100.0 234
2. Lower nonmanual 1.4 33.4 30.3 21.2 14.6 0.4 100.0 63
3. Upper manual 1.4 26.4 25.3 31.2 16.4 0.7 100.0 109
4. Lower manual 1.4 21.1 27.4 27.7 22.4 1.5 100.0 63
5. Farming 1.5 25.6 17.7 29.4 15.2 12.1 100.0 13
N 179 119 110 68 6 482
2. Lower nonmanual 1. Upper nonmanual 1.3 45.2 25.1 14.9 13.5 1.3 100.0 131
2. Lower nonmanual 1.3 30.7 33.0 17.6 18.2 0.5 100.0 69
3. Upper manual 1.3 24.6 27.9 26.1 20.7 0.8 100.0 89
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4. Lower manual 1.3 19.0 29.3 22.5 27.4 1.7 100.0 66
5. Farming 1.4 23.5 19.2 24.2 18.9 14.1 100.0 1
N 115 100 70 67 4 356
3. Upper manual 1. Upper nonmanual 1.5 34.2 25.0 25.0 14.0 1.8 100.0 206
2. Lower nonmanual 1.4 22.1 31.2 27.9 18.0 0.7 100.0 125
3. Upper manual 1.4 16.5 24.7 38.7 19.0 1.0 100.0 422
4. Lower manual 1.4 12.9 26.0 33.5 25.4 2.2 100.0 200
5. Farming 1.5 15.2 16.3 34.5 16.7 17.4 100.0 9
N 195 248 320 184 15 962
4. Lower manual 1. Upper nonmanual 1.4 32.5 23.6 23.6 18.9 1.4 100.0 196
2. Lower nonmanual 1.4 20.7 29.0 26.0 23.8 0.6 100.0 141
3. Upper manual 1.4 15.4 22.8 35.9 25.1 0.8 100.0 466
4. Lower manual 1.4 11.7 23.5 30.3 32.7 1.7 100.0 390
5. Farming 1.5 14.6 15.6 33.1 22.8 13.9 100.0 44
N 217 292 383 325 20 1,237
5. Farming 1. Upper nonmanual 1.6 30.9 15.2 32.4 19.2 2.3 100.0 143
2. Lower nonmanual 1.6 19.8 18.9 36.0 24.4 0.9 100.0 75
3. Upper manual 1.5 13.9 14.0 46.8 24.2 1.2 100.0 387
4. Lower manual 1.6 10.7 14.6 40.1 32.0 2.6 100.0 305
5. Farming 1.7 12.1 8.8 39.6 20.2 19.3 100.0 195
N 169 152 454 276 54 1,105
Source: IPUMS Linked Representative Samples, 1850–1930 (final data release June 2010); Panel Study of Income Dynamics,
1968–2015.
Notes: The three-generation transition matrix shows percentages converted from mobility probabilities, e.g., pY3=j|Y2=i,Y1=k;
namely, the son of a father in social position i and a grandfather in social position k ends up in position j.
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Table 3. Ratio Measures of Mobility Effects and Social Reproduction Effects by Comparing Upper Nonmanual and Lower Nonmanual
Families in Producing Offspring in Upper Nonmanual Occupations
Mobility Effect Social Reproduction Effect
Net Effect Total Effect Net Effect Total Effect
(assuming fathers and
grandfathers in the
same occupation)
(unconditional on
fathers’ occupations)
(assuming fathers and
grandfathers in the
same occupation)
(unconditional on
fathers’ occupations)
Historial data
Parents 1.317 1.317 1.456 1.456
(0.044) (0.044) (0.055) (0.055)
Grandparents 1.490 1.133 1.720 1.344
(0.085) (0.058) (0.109) (0.080)
Contemporary data
Parents 1.596 1.596 1.622 1.622
(0.146) (0.146) (0.164) (0.164)
Grandparents 1.566 1.178 1.691 1.277
(0.195) (0.121) (0.233) (0.157)
Source: IPUMS Linked Representative Samples, 1850–1930 (final data release June 2010); Panel Study of Income Dynamics, 1968–2015.
Notes: Standard errors of the predicted net and total mobility effect and social reproduction effect are estimated from 1,000 bootstrap samples. The net mobility effect
refers to the ratio between the probability of achieving upper nonmanual occupations by having upper nonmanual parents rather than lower nonmanual parents (or upper
nonmanual grandparents and parents versus lower nonmanual grandparents and parents). The total mobility effect is calculated from the ratio between the probability of
achieving upper nonmanual occupations by having upper nonmanual grandparents rather than lower nonmanual grandparents. The net social reproduction effect of parents
compares parents in upper nonmanual occupations with those in lower nonmanual occupations in producing upper nonmanual offspring. The net social reproduction
effect of grandparents compares grandparents in upper nonmanual occupations with those in lower nonmanual occupations in producing upper nonmanual grandchildren,
assuming that parents are in the same occupations as grandparents. The total effect of grandparents compares grandparents who are in upper nonmanual occupations
with those in lower nonmanual occupations in producing upper nonmanual grandchildren. The mobility effects and social reproduction effects are defined in equations
(11)–(16).
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Table 4. Effect Decomposition Based on Difference Measures of Social Reproduction Effects by Comparing Upper Nonmanual and Lower
Nonmanual Families in Producing Offspring in Upper Nonmanual Occupations
Kitagawa Decomposition Das Gupta Decomposition
Total Social Total Demography Total Mobility Demography Demography Mobility Mobility
Reproduction Effect (TSRE) Effect Effect Effect(1) Effect(2) Effect(1) Effect(2)
(%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%)
Historical data
Parents 0.253 0.068 0.185 0.068 - 0.185 -
(100.0) (26.7) (73.3) (26.7) (73.3)
Grandparents 0.431 0.230 0.201 0.146 0.085 0.020 0.181
(100.0) (53.4) (46.6) (33.8) (19.7) (4.6) (41.9)
Contemporary data
Parents 0.215 0.007 0.207 0.007 - 0.207 -
(100.0) (3.5) (96.5) (3.5) (96.5)
Grandparents 0.157 0.048 0.109 0.011 0.038 0.061 0.048
(100.0) (30.8) (69.2) (6.7) (24.0) (38.7) (30.5)
Source: IPUMS Linked Representative Samples, 1850–1930 (final data release June 2010); Panel Study of Income Dynamics, 1968–2015.
Note: Numbers in the parentheses are percentages of the total effect explained by each of the demographic and social mobility components. The decomposition methods
are described in equations (20), (21) and (23)–(26). The Das Gupta decomposition method divides the TSRE of grandparents into the mobility and fertility effects from the
grandparents on the parents and from the grandparents on the grandchildren net of the parents. Specifically, the TSRE of grandparents are decomposed into the effect of
grandparents’ occupation on their own number of offspring (demographic effect (1)), parents’ number of offspring (demographic effect (2)), parents’ mobility (mobility effect
(1)), and grandchildren’s mobility (mobility effect (2)).
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Table 5. Long-term Social Reproduction Effects
Distribution of Descendants Long-term SRE
in producing
upper nonmanual
descendants
Occupation in the
founding generation 1. Upper nonmanual 2. Lower nonmanual 3. Upper manual 4. Lower manual 5. Farming
Historical data
After n generations
1 Upper nonmanual 0.81 0.84 0.21 0.54 0.20 1.46
Lower nonmanual 0.55 1.06 0.21 0.42 0.12
5 Upper nonmanual 17.24 25.45 10.36 35.51 30.55 1.12
Lower nonmanual 15.36 22.87 9.23 31.52 25.29
10 Upper nonmanual 2,190.05 3,036.50 1,288.62 4,507.76 5,566.03 1.15
Lower nonmanual 1,906.90 2,652.90 1,124.17 3,930.59 4,775.19
∞ Upper nonmanual - - - - - 1.16
Lower nonmanual - - - - -
Contemporary data
After n generations
1 Upper nonmanual 0.56 0.33 0.33 0.22 0.02 1.62
Lower nonmanual 0.34 0.41 0.38 0.29 0.01
5 Upper nonmanual 1.38 1.44 1.90 1.34 0.10 1.02
Lower nonmanual 1.35 1.40 1.85 1.31 0.09
10 Upper nonmanual 8.31 8.63 11.41 8.05 0.57 1.02
Lower nonmanual 8.12 8.44 11.16 7.87 0.56
∞ Upper nonmanual - - - - - 1.02
Lower nonmanual - - - - -
Source: IPUMS Linked Representative Samples, 1850–1930 (final data release June 2010); Panel Study of Income Dynamics, 1968–2015.
Notes: Intergenerational mobility is assumed to follow a Markovian process. Similar results are valid if mobility follows higher-order Markovian processes. The long-term
effect is defined as the ratio of upper nonmanual progeny per upper nonmanual ancestor over upper nonmanual progeny per lower nonmanual ancestor. When the ratio
= 1, there is no long-term effect. The effect is defined in equation (a.22).
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Table 6. Two-Sex Assortative Mating and Force of Attraction (Age 25–60)
Occupation, Women
Occupation, Men 1. Upper nonmanual 2. Lower nonmanual 3. Upper manual 4. Lower manual 5. Farming N
1. Upper nonmanual 0.858 0.723 0.181 0.253 0.018
(348) (431) (78) (146) (2) 1,005
2. Lower nonmanual 0.321 0.643 0.219 0.323 0.010
(98) (259) (70) (127) (1) 555
3. Upper manual 0.274 0.677 0.642 0.673 0.164
(126) (487) (316) (465) (19) 1,413
4. Lower manual 0.220 0.400 0.560 0.849 0.307
(95) (263) (259) (537) (35) 1,189
5. Farming 0.078 0.142 0.194 0.409 0.863
(13) (27) (33) (77) (69) 219
N 680 1,467 756 1,352 126 4,381
Source: Panel Study of Income Dynamics, 1968–2015.
Notes: Numbers in parentheses refer to the number of marriages within each assortative mating category. The parameter for the
“force of attraction” (αij) represents the likelihood that men and women from two occupation groups will form unions. This value is a
function of preferences between two occupation groups and constraints imposed by the sizes of the two groups. The force of attraction
is defined in equation (37).
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Table 7. Ratio Measures of Social Reproduction Effects under Different Mating and Mobility Rules
Total Social Reproduction Effects of Upper Nonmanual
vs. Lower Nonmanual Parents
Mating Rule Intergenerational Mobility Rule Difference measure Ratio measure
Random mating Same-sex (father-son; mother-daughter) 0.034 2.014
Two-sex 0.041 1.987
Immobility (perfect inheritance) 0.160 ∞
Endogamous mating Same-sex (father-son; mother-daughter) 0.193 2.940
Two-sex 0.234 2.900
Immobility 0.695 ∞
Assortative mating Same-sex (father-son; mother-daughter) 0.103 3.225
Two-sex 0.125 3.180
Immobility (perfect inheritance) 0.356 ∞
Source: Panel Study of Income Dynamics (1968–2015) and simulation data.
Notes: The total effect of parents compares parents who are in upper nonmanual occupations with those in lower nonmanual
occupations in producing upper nonmanual offspring. The ratio = 1 means no effect. The effect accounts for probabilities that
men and women in upper nonmanual (or lower nonmanual) occupations will form unions, produce offspring, and transmit their
social status to their offspring. The random mating rule assumes mating between individuals where the choice of partner is
not influenced by occupations. The endogamous mating rule assumes men and women marry only within their own occupation
groups. The assortative mating rule assumes individuals with similar occupations mate with one another more frequently
than would be expected under a random mating rule. The same-sex mobility rule assumes individuals are influenced by their
same-sex parent only (namely, sons by fathers and daughters by mothers). The two-sex mobility rule assumes individuals’
occupations are influenced by occupations of both parents. The immobility rule assumes sons inherit occupations from their
fathers and daughters inherit occupations from their mothers.
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Table 8. A Summary of Intergenerational Social Mobility Research
Models Composition Mobility Demography Methods Exemplary Prior Research
Classic Mobility One-Sex Two-Generation No Markov chain models Prais (1955)
Models Mobility tables and path
analysis
Blau and Duncan (1967); Featherman and
Hauser (1978)
OLS models Hout (2018)
Loglinear models DiPrete (1990); Erikson and Goldthorpe
(1992); Grusky and Hauser (1984); Hout
(1988); Jonsson et al. (2009); Torche (2011);
Yamaguchi (1987); Xie (1992)
Log-log regression Behrman and Taubman (1985); Landersø and
Heckman (2017); Mazumder (2005); Mitnik
and Grusky (2017); Solon (1992)
One-Sex Multiple-Generation No Loglinear models Chan and Boliver (2013)
Survival analysis Zeng and Xie (2014)
Rank-rank regression Pfeffer and Killewald (2017)
Log-log regression Long and Ferrie (2018); Solon (2014, 2018);
Two-Sex Two-Generation No Loglinear models Beller (2009)
Rank-rank regression Chetty et al. (2014)
Log-log regression Lee and Solon (2009)
Two-Sex Multiple-Generation No Path analysis Warren and Hauser (1997)
Variance component model Jæger (2012)
Joint Demography- One-Sex Two-Generation Yes Markov chain models Matras (1961); Preston (1974); Mare (1997)
Mobility Models Mare and Maralani (2006); Maralani (2013)
One-Sex Multiple-Generation Yes Markov chain models Mare and Song (2014)
Two-Sex Two-Generation Yes Markov chain models Preston and Campbell (1993)
Two-Sex Multiple-Generation Yes Markov chain models Song and Mare (2017)
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APPENDIX A AN EXTENSION OF THE ONE-SEX MULTIGENERATIONAL
MODEL WITH MARRIAGE
In this section, I extend Matras’ two-generation social reproduction model in equation (7) to multi-
ple generations. Specifically, I add parameters that characterize the likelihood of marriage in each
generation and grandparents’ socioeconomic characteristics. The model is specified as
sj|ikl,c = fikl,c ·mikl,c · rikl,c · pYn=j|Yn−1=i,Yn−2=k,Yn−3=l,Y¯=c (a.1)
where sj|ikl,c denotes the number of men in the offspring generation who are in class j (j = 1, ...J)
with fathers in class i (i = 1, ..., I), grandfathers in class k (k = 1, ...,K), and great-grandfathers
in class l (l = 1, ..., L); mikl,c denotes the probability of getting married (or the average number
of marriages) for men in the parent generation, fikl,c; and rikl,c denotes the expected number of
sons born to men, in each marriage, in the parent generation. The extra subscript c (c = 1, ..., C)
refers to this person’s ancestral traits that do not change over generations (e.g., an indicator of
remote family history of slavery or royalty). More generally, if the model parameters depend on
the socioeconomic status of all prior generations, Y¯n−1 = {Y1, Y2, · · · , Yn−1}, the model can be
expressed as
sYn =
∑
Y1
· · ·
∑
Yn−1
fY¯n−1 ·mY¯n−1 · rY¯n−1 · pYn|Y¯n−1 (a.2)
To predict the number of descendants in the nth generation, we rely on the recursive relationship
shown in equation (8). The resulting model is written as,
s
(n)
Yn
=
∑
Y1
· · ·
∑
Yn−1
fY1 ·mY1 · rY1 · pY2|Y1 ·mY¯2 · rY¯2 · pY3|Y¯2 · · ·mY¯n−1 · rY¯n−1 · pYn|Y¯n−1
=
∑
Y1
· · ·
∑
Yn−1
fY1 ·
n−1∏
i=1
mY¯i · rY¯i · pYi+1|Y¯i (a.3)
The marriage (m), fertility (r), and social mobility (p) terms can be modeled by generalized linear
models as functions of independent variables. For example, marriage outcomes are often assumed
to be dichotomous if the probability of getting married is considered, or non-negative counts if the
number of marriages is considered. The latter applies to populations that have high rates of multi-
partner fertility or polygamy. The marriage term thus can be characterized by a logit or negative
binomial function. Reproduction outcomes are often assumed to follow a Poisson distribution with
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a possible overdispersion parameter and modeled by the negative binomial function. The mobility
term can be modeled by multinomial logistic models when multiple categories of social statuses are
used as the dependent variable. This model is restricted to influences of the father, grandfather, and
great-grandfather, but similar recursive models can incorporate influences from more generations
or paternal and maternal sides of the family.
When the marriage component is added, the Kitagawa method can still be used to partition
the social reproduction effect in equation (20) into demography and mobility effects. Below, I
illustrate the method assuming that m, r, and p depend only on the socioeconomic characteristics
of the parent generation, but the method can also be used when characteristics of more generations
are considered. I first partition the SRE into the demographic part that combines marriage and
reproduction effects and the mobility part.
SREk|j = (mkrk −mjrj) ·
(pY2=k|Y1=k + pY2=k|Y1=j)
2
+
(mkrk +mjrj)
2
· (pY2=k|Y1=k − pY2=k|Y1=j).
(a.4)
For the term (mkrk−mjrj), I repeat the Kitagawa decomposition method and separate the marriage
and reproduction effects:
SREk|j =
(
(mk −mj) · (rk + rj)
2
+ (rk − rj) · (mk +mj)
2
)
· (pY2=k|Y1=k + pY2=k|Y1=j)
2
+
(mkrk +mjrj)
2
· (pY2=k|Y1=k − pY2=k|Y1=j).
(a.5)
Let m¯ =
mk+mj
2 , r¯ =
rk+rj
2 , mr =
mkrk+mjrj
2 , and p¯ =
pY2=k|Y1=k+pY2=k|Y1=j
2 , and the above
equation can be further simplified as
SREk|j = (mk −mj) · r¯ · p¯︸ ︷︷ ︸
marriage effect
+ (rk − rj) · m¯ · p¯︸ ︷︷ ︸
reproduction effect
+mr · (pY2=k|Y1=k − pY2=k|Y1=j)︸ ︷︷ ︸
mobility effect
. (a.6)
The marriage effect shows differences in SRE attributed to differences in marriage rates of high-
status and low-status fathers, fixing the reproductive rates of fathers and mobility probabilities
of their offspring at the mean levels, r¯ and p¯. The reproduction effect shows differences in SRE
attributed to differences in reproductive rates of high-status and low-status fathers, fixing the
marriage rates of fathers and mobility probabilities of their offspring at the mean levels, m¯ and
p¯. The mobility effect refers to differences in SRE due to differences in mobility probabilities of
offspring from high-status and low-status fathers, fixing fathers’ demographic rates at the mean
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level, mr. We can also use Das Gupta’s 1993 decomposition method discussed in Section 4.3 to
decompose SRE as follows. The Das Gupta’s method is particularly useful when the demographic
rates contains multiple factors.
marriage effect =
[
rk · pY2=k|Y1=k + rj · pY2=k|Y1=j
3
+
rk · pY2=k|Y1=j + rj · pY2=k|Y1=k
6
]
· (mk −mj)
(a.7)
reproduction effect =
[
mk · pY2=k|Y1=k +mj · pY2=k|Y1=j
3
+
mk · pY2=k|Y1=j +mj · pY2=k|Y1=k
6
]
· (rk − rj)
(a.8)
mobility effect =
[
mk · rk +mj · rj
3
+
mk · rj +mj · rk
6
]
· (pY2=k|Y1=k − pY2=k|Y1=j) (a.9)
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APPENDIX B AGE-CLASSIFIED MODELS
Regular mobility models often ignore the age structure of the parent or the offspring generation.
Such a simplification does not affect our understanding of the long-term behaviors of a Markov
chain, namely, the chances that individuals will achieve a certain social class conditional on their
parent’s or ancestor’s social status. Yet, the distribution of fathers or sons, even after accounting
for the reproduction factor, reflects only the overall size of each generation, not the population
structure at a given point in time. From a demographic perspective, all accurate representations of
population growth—or “transformations of occupation structure” (Duncan 1966a)—depend on age-
specific fertility and mortality rates. In his classic work on population projection, P. H. Leslie (1945:
183) showed that “the age distribution of the survivors and descendants of the original population
at successive intervals of time” can be derived from simple matrix multiplication, assuming the
regime of mortality and fertility is time-constant or year-to-year change in mortality and fertility is
known. Keyfitz (1964) introduced this method to the study of human populations. Specifically, let
ri,t refer to age-specific fertility rates, often based on five-year age groups, for social class i and age
group t; ri,t is a positive number for men within the reproductive age range and zero otherwise. In
addition, let 5
Li,t+5
5Li,t
refer to the life table function of surviving from age t to t+ 5 for social class i.
The social reproduction models shown in equation (7) thus can be represented as
sj,1 =
I∑
i=1
T∑
t=1
fi,t · ri,t · pY2=j|Y1=i (j = 1, 2, ..., J) (a.10)
sj,t+5 = sj,t · 5Lj,t+5
5Lj,t
(a.11)
fi,t+5 = fi,t · 5Li,t+5
5Li,t
(a.12)
Note that this model assumes social attainment is completed at birth, and no intragenerational
mobility is allowed for either the father or son generation. Predictions based on these assumptions
may detract from the exact number of incumbents in each social class, but this will not affect
conclusions regarding the overall social trend from an intergenerational perspective. The matrix
forms of similar models based on the Leslie matrix are described in Matras (1967) and Mare (1997).
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APPENDIX C A GENERALIZATION OF THE SRE DECOMPOSITION METHOD
In this section, I generalize the decomposition method for parent and grandparent SRE described
in Section 4.3 to multiple generations. First, following the decomposition method for grandparents
illustrated in equations (23)–(26), we can derive the decomposition for four generations. To simplify
the notations below, I use r1, r2, r3 to indicate the reproduction of the great-grandparent, grandpar-
ent, and parent generation, respectively, and p1, p2, and p3 to indicate the mobility probability of
grandparents, parents, and offspring generation conditional on all prior generations, respectively.27
The total effect of great-grandparents is thus expressed as
TSREGGPk|j =
∑
Y2
∑
Y3
r1 · p1 · r2 · p2 · r3 · p3 −
∑
Y2
∑
Y3
r′1 · p′1 · r′2 · p′2 · r′3 · p′3
which can then be partitioned using Das Gupta’s method for rates of six factors. For example,
the demography effect from the first generation r1 versus r
′
1 is:
demography effect (1) =
∑
Y2
∑
Y3
[
p1r2p2r3p3 + p
′
1r
′
2p
′
2r
′
3p
′
3
6
+
p1r2p2r3p
′
3 + p1r2p2r
′
3p3 + p1r2p
′
2r3p3 + p1r
′
2p2r3p3 + p
′
1r2p2r3p3
+ p′1r′2p′2r′3p3 + p′1r′2p′2r3p′3 + p′1r′2p2r′3p′3 + p′1r2p′2r′3p′3 + p1r′2p′2r′3p′3
30
+
p1r2p2r
′
3p
′
3 + p1r2p
′
2r3p
′
3 + p1r2p
′
2r
′
3p3 + p1r
′
2p2r3p
′
3 + p1r
′
2p2r
′
3p3
+p1r
′
2p
′
2r3p3 + p
′
1r2p2r3p
′
3 + p
′
1r2p2r
′
3p3 + p
′
1r2p
′
2r3p3 + p
′
1r
′
2p2r3p3
+p′1r′2p′2r3p3 + p′1r′2p2r′3p3 + p′1r′2p2r3p′3 + p′1r2p′2r′3p3 + p′1r2p′2r3p′3
+ p′1r2p2r′3p′3 + p1r′2p′2r′3p3 + p1r′2p′2r3p′3 + p1r′2p2r′3p′3 + p1r2p′2r′3p′3
60
]
· (r1 − r′1) (a.13)
Demography effects (2)–(3) and mobility effects (1)–(3) can be derived easily by interchanging the
terms in equation (a.13). The total effect of great-grandparents is equal to the sum of all separate
effects.
Overall, the total effect of an N th ancestor defined in equation (19) can be decomposed into 2N
terms, including demographic effects and mobility effects from each of the N prior generations. Be-
low, I apply the decomposition method of rates as the product of P factors proposed by Das Gupta
(1993). To simplify the notations for demographic and mobility parameters in each generation, I
27For example, r1 = rk, r
′
1 = rj , r2 = rkk, r
′
2 = rjj , r3 = rkkk, r
′
3 = rkjj , p1 = pY2=k|Y1=k, p
′
1 = pY2=j|Y1=j ,
p2 = pY3=k|Y2=k,Y1=k, p
′
2 = pY3=k|Y2=j,Y1=j , p3 = pY4=k|Y3=k,Y2=k,Y1=k, and p
′
3 = pY4=k|Y3=k,Y2=j,Y1=j .
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denote the demographic parameter in the nth generation (n = 1 · · ·N) as follows,
rn = rYn|Y¯n−1,k and r
′
n = rYn|Y¯n−1,j .
I use r and r′ to differentiate between two ancestors in the founding generation with social status
k and j, respectively. Similarly, the mobility parameters in the nth generation are
pn = pYn+1|Y¯n,k and p
′
n = pYn+1|Y¯n,j .
Suppose the elements r and p are members of the set A = {r1, · · · , rN , p1, · · · , pN} and r′ and
p′ are members of set A′. The set A, excluding one element An (e.g., rn), is defined as A\An
(or A\rn). The TSRE(n)k|j =
∑
Y2
· · ·∑Yn−1 r1 · · · rN−1 · p1 · · · pN−1 − r′1 · · · r′N−1 · p′1 · · · p′N−1 can
be decomposed into the sum of the demography effect (n) and mobility effect (n) from the nth
generation. For example, Das Gupta (1993: 15–16) described the decomposition of (r1 · · · rN−1 ·
p1 · · · pN−1)− (r′1 · · · r′N−1 · p′1 · · · p′N−1) as
demography effect (n) =
N∑
t=1
sum of all (2N − 1) terms with (2N − t) from the set A\rn and (t− 1)
from the set A′\r′n or (2N − t) terms from A′\r′n and (t− 1) from A\rn
2N · (2N−1t−1 )
· (rn − r′n) (a.14)
More formally, I introduce the following notations to define the demography effect in equation
(a.14). Let B2N−t denote subsets of A\An with a cardinality of 2N − t (i.e., |B| = 2N − t). Given
that there are
(
2N−1
2N−t
)
of such subsets, each subset i is denoted by
B2N−t,i = {B2N−t,i : B2N−t,i ∈ A\An}.
The complement of the set B2N−t,i can be written as B¯2N−t,i, which satisfies that B¯2N−t,i = Bt−1,i
with the cardinality of t− 1. Taking our illustration of the total effect of grandparents with N = 2
as an example, the set B21 = {r2, p2} is one subset with cardinality 2 of the set A\r1 = {r2, p1, p2}.
Other subsets include B22 = {r2, p1} and B23 = {p1, p2}, where the total number of subsets with
cardinality 2 is
(
3
2
)
= 3. The complement set of B21 in the counterpart set of A′ is B¯′21 = B′11 = {p′1}.
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demography effect (n) =
N∑
t=1
(2N−12N−t)∑
i=1
 ∏
B∈B2N−t
B2N−t,i ·
∏
B′∈B′t−1
B′t−1,i +
∏
B′∈B′2N−t
B′2N−t,i ·
∏
B∈Bt−1
Bt−1,i

2N · (2N−1t−1 )
· (rn − r′n) (a.15)
Likewise, if the set B is a subset of A\pn, the mobility effect can be written as
mobility effect (n) =
N∑
t=1
(2N−12N−t)∑
i=1
 ∏
B∈B2N−t
B2N−t,i ·
∏
B′∈B′t−1
B′t−1,i +
∏
B′∈B′2N−t
B′2N−t,i ·
∏
B∈Bt−1
Bt−1,i

2N · (2N−1t−1 )
· (pn − p′n) (a.16)
S-7
APPENDIX D EQUILIBRIUM EFFECTS
In this section, I show the equilibrium of Markov chain models with demography. Recall that in
regular Markovian mobility models with a time-invariant transition matrix, the effect of a fam-
ily’s initial social status will disappear in the long run. After enough generations, the probability
distribution of descendants from high-status and low-status families will converge to the same equi-
librium. However, as illustrated in the paper, this property does not hold when considering families’
reproductive behaviors. According to the definition in equation (27), the long-term mobility effect
in equation (27) is defined as
LSRE = lim
t→∞
S(t)k|k
S
(t)
k|j
 .
Now we assume S(t) = F(0) ·Ct, where C = R ·P, a combination of the reproduction and mobility
components. According to the Perron-Frobenius theorem, C would be a square matrix with positive
entries and a unique dominant eigenvalue.28 The long-term behavior of S(t) would depend on the
largest eigenvalue of C.
To see this, we assume C has n linearly independent left eigenvectors v1,v2 . . .vn with cor-
responding eigenvalues of λ1, λ2, . . . λn. Assume the eigenvalues are ordered so that |λ1| > · · · ≥
|λn−1| ≥ |λn|. For the social class distribution in the first generation S(1), we can write this vector
as the linear combination of the eigenvectors of C:
S(1) = a1v1 + a2v2 + · · ·+ anvn (a.17)
where a1 · · · an are scalars and a1 6= 0. Then, multiplying both sides by C produces
S(1) ·C = (a1v1 + a2v2 + · · ·+ anvn) ·C (a.18)
Using the spectral decomposition theorem,
S(1) ·C = a1(λ1v1) + a2(λ2v2) + · · ·+ an(λnvn). (a.19)
28This assumption implies that the number of social classes is the same for fathers and sons, and the marriage,
fertility, and mobility matrices have no structural 0s. That is, men in different social classes may get married and
have sons, and all sons may stay in the same social class as their fathers or move to other classes.
S-8
Repeating the multiplication on both sides produces
S(1) ·Ct−1 = a1(λt−11 v1) + a2(λt−12 v2) + · · ·+ an(λt−1n vt) = S(t). (a.20)
As λ1 is assumed to be larger in absolute value than the other eigenvalues, it follows that each of the
fractions λ2λ1 ,
λ3
λ1
. . . λnλ1 is less than 1 in absolute value. Each of the factors
(
λ2
λ1
)t−1
,
(
λ3
λ1
)t−1
. . .
(
λn
λ1
)t−1
must converge to 0 as t− 1 approaches infinity. Therefore, we have the following relationship
S(t) ' a1
(
λt−11 v1
)
. (a.21)
For the initial vector F(0) = [f1, f2, · · · , fn], let F(0)k = [0, · · · fk = 1, · · · 0] and F(0)j = [0, · · · fj =
1, · · · 0], so that the entire initial cohort is located in a single class. Assume a1 = a1k, when S(1) =
F
(0)
k C, and a1 = a1j , when S
(1) = F
(0)
j C. After t generations, the long-term social reproduction
effect would converge to
LSRE = lim
t→∞
(
a1kλ
t−1
1 v1
a1jλ
t−1
1 v1
)
=
a1k
a1j
. (a.22)
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APPENDIX E ADDITIONAL RANDOM MATING FUNCTIONS
In the main analysis, I define the random mating rule as follows:
µij(N
m,Nf ) =
Nmi N
f
j
(Nm + Nf )/2
(a.23)
where Nm =
∑
i N
m
i and N
f =
∑
j N
f
j . Compared to the assortative mating rule, random mating
assumes the number of marriages between men in class i and women in class j is only constrained
by the abundance of mates.
The random mating rule can be defined differently depending on our assumption about the
constraint imposed by the size of male and female populations. For example, random mating rules
can be defined as
µij(N
m,Nf ) =
Nmi + N
f
j
2
(arithmetic mean)
µij(N
m,Nf ) =
√
Nmi N
f
j (geometric mean)
µij(N
m,Nf ) = aNmi + (1− a)Nfj , 0 ≤ a ≤ 1, (weighted mean)
µij(N
m,Nf ) = Nmi (male dominance)
µij(N
m,Nf ) = Nfj (female dominance)
µij(N
m,Nf ) = min(Nmi ,N
f
j ) (minimum abundance)
These functions are all considered as random mating because the number of marriages does not
depend on parameters related to individual preferences between different class groups.
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APPENDIX F ADDITIONAL TABLES USED IN THE ILLUSTRATIVE EX-
AMPLES
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Appendix Table S1. Two-Generation Reproduction and Social Mobility Models, Historical Data
Mobility Model: Son’s Occupation
Gross Reproduction Rate (Multinomial Logistic Regression, Base = 1. Upper nonmanual)
(Poisson Regression) 2. Lower nonmanual 3. Upper manual 4. Lower manual 5. Farming
Father’s Occupation
2. Lower nonmanual -0.100*** (0.02) 0.607*** (0.05) 0.371*** (0.079) 0.108* (0.061) -0.161* (0.093)
3. Upper manual 0.004 (0.015) 0.732*** (0.048) 2.234*** (0.057) 1.686*** (0.048) 1.145*** (0.065)
4. Lower manual -0.004 (0.014) 0.675*** (0.047) 1.595*** (0.06) 2.418*** (0.045) 1.432*** (0.061)
5. Farming 0.161*** (0.012) -0.908*** (0.043) 0.280*** (0.056) 0.667*** (0.039) 3.803*** (0.047)
Intercept 0.956*** (0.011) 0.037 (0.027) -1.355*** (0.043) -0.394*** (0.031) -1.388*** (0.043)
n 27,734 78,133
Log likelihood -57,136
AIC 114,283 163,900
Source: IPUMS Linked Representative Samples, 1850–1930 (final data release June 2010).
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses. The Gross Reproduction Rates and mobility probabilities estimated from these models are presented in Table 1.
∗p < .05;∗∗ p < .01;∗∗∗ p < .001 (two-tailed test).S-12
Appendix Table S2. Three-Generation Reproduction and Social Mobility Models, Historical Data
Mobility Model: Son’s Occupation
Gross Reproduction Rate (Multinomial Logistic Regression, Base = 1. Upper nonmanual)
(Poisson Regression) 2. Lower nonmanual 3. Upper manual 4. Lower manual 5. Farming
Father’s Occupation
1. Upper nonmanual (reference)
2. Lower nonmanual -0.058** (0.028) 0.196** (0.076) 0.182* (0.11) 0.203** (0.088) -0.079 (0.128)
3. Upper manual 0.013 (0.017) 0.323*** (0.054) 0.878*** (0.066) 0.721*** (0.055) 0.775*** (0.068)
4. Lower manual 0.029* (0.016) 0.411*** (0.053) 0.620*** (0.068) 1.057*** (0.053) 0.785*** (0.065)
5. Farming 0.111*** (0.015) 0.136*** (0.045) 0.183*** (0.061) 0.640*** (0.047) 1.294*** (0.054)
Grandfather’s Occupation
1. Upper nonmanual (reference)
2. Lower nonmanual -0.085*** (0.02) 0.574*** (0.052) 0.342*** (0.08) 0.077 (0.062) -0.131 (0.094)
3. Upper manual 0.004 (0.016) 0.612*** (0.051) 1.907*** (0.061) 1.443*** (0.051) 0.959*** (0.068)
4. Lower manual -0.016 (0.015) 0.545*** (0.05) 1.388*** (0.063) 2.092*** (0.048) 1.192*** (0.064)
5. Farming 0.098*** (0.013) -0.934*** (0.048) 0.290*** (0.061) 0.469*** (0.043) 3.306*** (0.05)
Intercept 0.916*** (0.014) -0.099*** (0.036) -1.625*** (0.055) -0.848*** (0.042) -2.080*** (0.058)
n 27,734 78,133
Log likelihood -57,104
AIC 114,226.5 162,099.0
Source: IPUMS Linked Representative Samples, 1850–1930 (final data release June 2010).
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses. The Gross Reproduction Rates and mobility probabilities estimated from these models are presented in Table 2.
∗p < .05;∗∗ p < .01;∗∗∗ p < .001 (two-tailed test).
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Appendix Table S3. Two-Generation Reproduction and Social Mobility Models, Contemporary Data
Mobility Model: Son’s Occupation
Gross Reproduction Rate (Multinomial Logistic Regression, Base = 1. Upper nonmanual)
(Poisson Regression) 2. Lower nonmanual 3. Upper manual 4. Lower manual 5. Farming
Father’s Occupation
1. Upper nonmanual (reference)
2. Lower nonmanual -0.016 (0.059) 0.711*** (0.154) 0.619*** (0.157) 0.773*** (0.171) -0.419 (0.645)
3. Upper manual -0.032 (0.043) 0.789*** (0.122) 1.373*** (0.116) 1.230*** (0.132) 0.353 (0.387)
4. Lower manual -0.021 (0.047) 1.083*** (0.141) 1.496*** (0.136) 1.808*** (0.145) 1.396*** (0.36)
5. Farming 0.11 (0.072) 0.312 (0.268) 1.575*** (0.215) 1.360*** (0.24) 3.514*** (0.352)
Intercept 0.375*** (0.034) -0.535*** (0.088) -0.535*** (0.088) -0.945*** (0.101) -3.219*** (0.273)
n 2,689 4,142
Log likelihood -3,457
AIC 6,924.4 11,609.8
Source: Panel Study of Income Dynamics, 1968–2015.
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses. The Gross Reproduction Rates and mobility probabilities estimated from these models are presented in Table 1.
∗p < .05;∗∗ p < .01;∗∗∗ p < .001 (two-tailed test).
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Appendix Table S4. Three-Generation Reproduction and Social Mobility Models, Contemporary Data
Mobility Model: Son’s Occupation
Gross Reproduction Rate (Multinomial Logistic Regression, Base = 1. Upper nonmanual)
(Poisson Regression) 2. Lower nonmanual 3. Upper manual 4. Lower manual 5. Farming
Father’s Occupation
1. Upper nonmanual (reference)
2. Lower nonmanual -0.059 (0.072) 0.17 (0.184) -0.105 (0.198) 0.306 (0.214) 0.241 (0.664)
3. Upper manual 0.029 (0.058) 0.442*** (0.156) 0.686*** (0.157) 0.620*** (0.181) 0.890* (0.507)
4. Lower manual 0.01 (0.057) 0.435*** (0.154) 0.679*** (0.154) 0.966*** (0.174) 0.703 (0.493)
5. Farming 0.129** (0.058) 0.052 (0.171) 1.049*** (0.159) 1.033*** (0.181) 1.217*** (0.472)
Grandfather’s Occupation
1. Upper nonmanual (reference)
2. Lower nonmanual -0.018 (0.059) 0.659*** (0.156) 0.547*** (0.159) 0.681*** (0.174) -0.498 (0.647)
3. Upper manual -0.051 (0.044) 0.715*** (0.126) 1.166*** (0.12) 1.031*** (0.136) 0.142 (0.394)
4. Lower manual -0.045 (0.049) 1.019*** (0.145) 1.272*** (0.14) 1.569*** (0.15) 1.177*** (0.369)
5. Farming 0.035 (0.076) 0.387 (0.278) 1.136*** (0.226) 0.985*** (0.251) 3.065*** (0.387)
Intercept 0.354*** (0.051) -0.757*** (0.131) -1.000*** (0.136) -1.509*** (0.16) -3.818*** (0.458)
n 2,690
Log likelihood -3,452.0
AIC 6,921.9
Source: Panel Study of Income Dynamics, 1968–2015.
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses. The Gross Reproduction Rates and mobility probabilities estimated from these models are presented in Table 2.
∗p < .05;∗∗ p < .01;∗∗∗ p < .001 (two-tailed test).
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APPENDIX G R CODES USED IN THE ANALYSIS OF THE PSID DATA
1 ###################################################################
2 ### Implementation of Various Joint Demography -Social Mobility ###
3 ### Models: ###
4 ### (1) 2g and 3g mobility table construction ###
5 ### (2) Ratio and difference measures of mobility effects ###
6 ### (3) Ratio and difference measures of social reproduction ###
7 ### effects ###
8 ### (4) Effect decomposition ###
9 ### (5) Long -term social reproduction effects ###
10 ### (6) Two -sex social reproduction models ###
11 ### Supplementary to: ###
12 ### "Multigenerational Social Mobility: A Demographic Approach" ###
13 ### Author: Xi Song ###
14 ###################################################################
15 library(readstata13)
16 library(tidyr)
17 library(dplyr)
18 library(expm)
19 library(nnet)
20 library(reshape)
21 require(boot)
22 library(parallel)
23
24 psid.male <- read.dta13("psid_mobility.dta", nonint.factors=T) %>%
25 select(c(f_id , sex , occ , occ_f, occ_m, occ_ff, occ_fm, occ_mf, occ_mm, occ_gf, sex)) %>%
drop_na(occ , occ_f, occ_gf) %>% filter(sex ==1)
26
27 ######################## Table 1 ###########################
28 # Two -Generation Mobility Transition Matrix and Gross
29 # Reproduction Rates
30 ############################################################
31 # Describe 2-generation mobility table (transition matrix)
32
33 summary(m1 <- multinom(occ ~ relevel(as.factor(occ_f), ref = "1"), data = psid.male))
34
35 data.2g <- cbind(psid.male , fitted=fitted(m1))
36 mobility2g <- data.2g %>%
37 group_by(occ_f) %>%
38 summarise(son1=mean(fitted .1), son2=mean(fitted .2), son3=mean(fitted .3), son4=mean(fitted
.4), son5=mean(fitted .5))
39 with(psid.male , addmargins(table(occ_f, occ)))
40
41 # Describe fertility by occupation
42
43 sons.count <- psid.male %>% filter(f_id != 0) %>% arrange(-f_id) %>% group_by(f_id , occ_f)
%>% summarise(sons.count=n())
44
45 summary(m2 <- glm(sons.count ~ relevel(as.factor(occ_f), ref = "1"), family="poisson", data=
sons.count))
46 GRR1 <- exp(c(0, rep(coefficients(m2)[1],4))+coefficients(m2))
47
48
49 ######################## Table 2 ###########################
50 # Three -Generation Mobility Transition Matrix and Gross
51 # Reproduction Rates
52 ############################################################
53
54 # Describe 3-generation mobility table
55 summary(m3 <- multinom(occ ~ relevel(as.factor(occ_gf), ref = "1")+relevel(as.factor(occ_f),
ref = "1"), data = psid.male))
56 data.3g <- cbind(psid.male , fitted=fitted(m3))
57 mobility3g <- data.3g %>%
58 group_by(occ_gf , occ_f) %>%
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59 summarise(son1=mean(fitted .1), son2=mean(fitted .2), son3=mean(fitted .3), son4=mean(fitted
.4), son5=mean(fitted .5))
60 with(psid.male , addmargins(table(occ_f, occ , occ_gf)))
61
62 # Describe fertility by occupation
63 sons.count2 <- psid.male %>% filter(f_id != 0) %>% arrange(-f_id) %>% group_by(f_id, occ_gf,
occ_f) %>% summarise(sons.count2=n())
64
65 summary(m4 <- glm(sons.count2 ~ relevel(as.factor(occ_gf), ref = "1")+relevel(as.factor(occ_
f), ref = "1"), family="poisson", data=sons.count2))
66 intercept <- coefficients(m4)[1]
67 gf_coef <- c(0, coefficients(m4)[2:5])
68 f_coef <- c(0, coefficients(m4)[6:9])
69
70 GRR2 <- exp(intercept) * (exp(gf_coef) %x% exp(f_coef))
71
72
73 ######################## Table 3 ###########################
74 # Ratio Measures of Mobility Effects and Social Reproduction
75 # Effects by Comparing Upper Nonmanual and Lower Nonmanual
76 # Families in Producing Offspring in Upper Nonmanual
77 # Occupations
78 ############################################################
79
80 # net and total mobility effect of p
81 mobility2g <- as.matrix(mobility2g [1:5, 2:6])
82 mobility2g [1,1]/mobility2g [2,1]
83
84 # net mobility effect of gp
85 mobility3g <- as.matrix(mobility3g [1:25, 3:7])
86 mobility3g [1,1]/mobility3g [7,1] #assume p and gp in the same class
87
88 # total mobility effect of gp
89 G0.1 <- c(1,0,0,0,0)
90 G0.2 <- c(0,1,0,0,0)
91 (G0.1 %*% mobility2g %*% mobility3g [1:5 ,])[1,1]/(G0.2%*%mobility2g%*%mobility3g [6:10 ,]) [1,1]
92
93 # SRE of parents
94 SRE.f <- (GRR1 [1]*mobility2g [1 ,1])/(GRR1 [2]*mobility2g [2,1])
95
96 # NSRE of grandparents
97 NSRE.gf <- (GRR2 [1]*mobility3g [1 ,1])/(GRR2 [7]*mobility3g [7,1])
98
99 # TSRE of grandparents
100
101 G1.1 <- G0.1 %*% diag(GRR1) %*% mobility2g
102 G2.1 <- G1.1 %*% diag(GRR2 [1:5]) %*% mobility3g [1:5,]
103
104 G1.2 <- G0.2 %*% diag(GRR1) %*% mobility2g
105 G2.2 <- G1.2 %*% diag(GRR2 [6:10]) %*% mobility3g [6:10 ,]
106
107 TSRE.gf <- G2.1[1]/G2 .2[1]
108
109 # bootstrap standard errors
110
111 bs <- function(formula1 , formula2 , formula3 , formula4 , data , indices) {
112 d1 = data[indices ,]
113
114 m1 = multinom(formula1 , data=d1 , maxit =1000, trace=FALSE)
115 data.2g <- cbind(d1 , fitted=fitted(m1))
116 mobility2g <- data.2g %>% group_by(occ_f) %>%
117 summarise(son1=mean(fitted .1), son2=mean(fitted .2), son3=mean(fitted .3), son4=mean(
fitted .4), son5=mean(fitted .5))
118
119 sons.count <- d1 %>% filter(f_id != 0) %>% arrange(-f_id) %>%
120 group_by(f_id, occ_f) %>% summarise(sons.count=n())
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121 m2 = glm(formula2 , family="poisson", data=sons.count , maxit =1000, trace=FALSE)
122 GRR1 <- exp(c(0, rep(coefficients(m2)[1],4))+coefficients(m2))
123
124 m3 = multinom(formula3 , data=d1 , maxit =1000, trace=FALSE)
125 data.3g <- cbind(d1 , fitted=fitted(m3))
126 mobility3g <- data.3g %>% group_by(occ_gf , occ_f) %>%
127 summarise(son1=mean(fitted .1), son2=mean(fitted .2), son3=mean(fitted .3), son4=mean(
fitted .4), son5=mean(fitted .5))
128
129 sons.count2 <- d1 %>% filter(f_id != 0) %>% arrange(-f_id) %>% group_by(f_id, occ_gf, occ_
f) %>% summarise(sons.count2=n())
130 m4 = glm(formula4 , family="poisson", data=sons.count2 , maxit =1000, trace=FALSE)
131 GRR2 <- exp(coefficients(m4)[1]) * (exp(c(0, coefficients(m4)[2:5])) %x% exp(c(0,
coefficients(m4)[6:9])))
132
133 mobility2g = as.matrix(mobility2g [1:5, 2:6])
134 mobility.f = mobility2g [1,1]/mobility2g [2,1]
135
136 mobility3g = as.matrix(mobility3g [1:25 , 3:7])
137 n.mobility.gf = mobility3g [1,1]/mobility3g [7,1]
138
139 G0.1 <- c(1,0,0,0,0); G0.2 <- c(0,1,0,0,0)
140 t.mobility.gf = (G0.1 %*% mobility2g %*% mobility3g [1:5 ,])[1,1]/(G0.2%*%mobility2g%*%
mobility3g [6:10 ,]) [1,1]
141
142 SRE.f = (GRR1 [1]*mobility2g [1,1])/(GRR1 [2]*mobility2g [2,1])
143 NSRE.gf = (GRR2 [1]*mobility3g [1,1])/(GRR2 [7]*mobility3g [7,1])
144
145 G1.1 <- G0.1 %*% diag(GRR1) %*% mobility2g
146 G2.1 <- G1.1 %*% diag(GRR2 [1:5]) %*% mobility3g [1:5,]
147 G1.2 <- G0.2 %*% diag(GRR1) %*% mobility2g
148 G2.2 <- G1.2 %*% diag(GRR2 [6:10]) %*% mobility3g [6:10 ,]
149 TSRE.gf = G2 .1[1]/G2.2[1]
150
151 estimates = rbind(mobility.f, SRE.f, n.mobility.gf, t.mobility.gf, NSRE.gf, TSRE.gf)
152
153 return(t(estimates))
154 }
155
156 # enable parallel
157
158 cl <- makeCluster (2)
159 clusterExport(cl, "multinom")
160
161 # 1000 replications
162 set.seed (1984)
163
164 #system.time(boot(data=psid.male , statistic=bs, R=1000 , parallel = "multicore", ncpus=2,
formula=occ ~ relevel(as.factor(occ_f), ref = "1")))
165
166 results <- boot(
167 data=psid.male , statistic=bs, R=1000 , parallel = "multicore", ncpus=2, cl=cl, formula1=occ
~ relevel(as.factor(occ_f), ref = "1"), formula2=sons.count ~ relevel(as.factor(occ_f
), ref = "1"), formula3=occ ~ relevel(as.factor(occ_gf), ref = "1")+relevel(as.factor(
occ_f), ref = "1"),
168 formula4=sons.count2 ~ relevel(as.factor(occ_gf), ref = "1")+relevel(as.factor(occ_f), ref
= "1")
169 )
170
171
172 ######################## Table 4 ###########################
173 # Effect Decomposition Based on Difference Measures of
174 # Social Reproduction Effects by Comparing Upper Nonmanual
175 # and Lower Nonmanual Families in Producing Offspring in
176 # Upper Nonmanual Occupations
177 ############################################################
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178
179 # Kitagawa SRE decomposition of SRE.f
180 kita.demo.eff.f <- (GRR1[1]-GRR1 [2])*(mobility2g [1 ,1]+ mobility2g [2,1])/2
181 kita.mobi.eff.f <- (GRR1 [1]+ GRR1 [2])/2*(mobility2g [1,1]- mobility2g [2 ,1])
182
183 # Kitagawa SRE decomposition of TSRE.gf
184 kita.demo.eff.gf <- sum((GRR1 [1]*GRR2 [1:5]- GRR1 [2]*GRR2 [5+1:5])*(mobility2g [1 ,1:5]*
mobility3g [1:5 ,1]+ mobility2g [2 ,1:5]*mobility3g [5+1:5 ,1])/2)
185 kita.mobi.eff.gf <- sum((GRR1 [1]*GRR2 [1:5]+ GRR1 [2]*GRR2 [5+1:5])/2*(mobility2g [1 ,1:5]*
mobility3g [1:5,1]- mobility2g [2 ,1:5]*mobility3g [5+1:5 ,1]))
186
187 # Das Gupta SRE decomposition of TSRE.gf
188 r1 <-GRR1 [1]; r1prime <- GRR1 [2]
189 r2 <- GRR2 [1:5]; r2prime <- GRR2 [5+1:5]
190 p1 <- mobility2g [1 ,1:5]; p1prime <- mobility2g [2 ,1:5]
191 p2 <- mobility3g [1:5 ,1]; p2prime <- mobility3g [5+1:5 ,1]
192
193 das.demo.eff .1.gf <-
194 sum (((p1*r2*p2+p1prime*r2prime*p2prime)/4
195 +(p1*r2*p2prime+p1*r2prime*p2+p1prime*r2*p2+p1prime*r2prime*p2+p1prime*r2*p2prime+p1*
r2prime*p2prime)/12)*(r1-r1prime))
196 das.demo.eff .2.gf <-
197 sum (((p1*r1*p2+p1prime*r1prime*p2prime)/4
198 +(p1*r1*p2prime+p1*r1prime*p2+p1prime*r1*p2+p1prime*r1prime*p2+p1prime*r1*p2prime+p1*
r1prime*p2prime)/12)*(r2-r2prime))
199 das.mobi.eff .1.gf <-
200 sum (((r1*r2*p2+r1prime*r2prime*p2prime)/4
201 +(r1*r2*p2prime+r1*r2prime*p2+r1prime*r2*p2+r1prime*r2prime*p2+r1prime*r2*p2prime+r1*
r2prime*p2prime)/12)*(p1-p1prime))
202 das.mobi.eff .2.gf <-
203 sum (((r1*r2*p1+r1prime*r2prime*p1prime)/4
204 +(r1*r2*p1prime+r1*r2prime*p1+r1prime*r2*p1+r1prime*r2prime*p1+r1prime*r2*p1prime+r1*
r2prime*p1prime)/12)*(p2-p2prime))
205
206
207 ######################## Table 5 ###########################
208 # Long -Term Social Reproduction Effects
209 ############################################################
210
211 # Long -term SRE (we assume mobility is Markovian)
212
213 C <- diag(GRR1) %*% mobility2g
214
215 G1.1 <- G0.1 %*% C
216 G2.1 <- G1.1 %*% C
217 G5.1 <- G0.1 %*% (C %^% (5))
218 G10.1 <- G0.1 %*% (C %^% (10))
219
220 G1.2 <- G0.2 %*% C
221 G2.2 <- G1.2 %*% C
222 G5.2 <- G0.2 %*% (C %^% (5))
223 G10.2 <- G0.2 %*% (C %^% (10))
224
225 eL <- eigen(t(C)) #left eigenvector
226 L <- eL$values
227 V <- eL$vectors
228 G1.1 %*% V %*% solve(t(V)%*%V)
229 G1.2 %*% V %*% solve(t(V)%*%V)
230
231
232 ######################## Table 6 ###########################
233 # Two -Sex Assortative Mating and Force of Attraction
234 # (age 25 -60)
235 ############################################################
236
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237 psid <- read.dta13("psid_mobility.dta", nonint.factors=T) %>% select(c(f_id , m_id, occ , occ_
f, occ_m, sex)) %>% drop_na(occ , occ_f, occ_m)
238
239 child.count <- psid %>% filter(f_id != 0 | m_id != 0) %>% arrange(-f_id, -m_id) %>% group_by
(f_id, m_id , occ_f, occ_m) %>% summarise(child.count=n())
240 summary(m5 <- glm(child.count ~ relevel(as.factor(occ_f), ref = "1")+relevel(as.factor(occ_m
), ref = "1"), family="poisson", data=child.count))
241 intercept <- coefficients(m5)[1]
242 f_coef <- c(0, coefficients(m5)[2:5])
243 m_coef <- c(0, coefficients(m5)[6:9])
244
245 GRR.son <- GRR.daughter <- exp(intercept) * (exp(f_coef) %x% exp(m_coef))
246
247 mobility.samesex.son <- with(filter(psid , sex ==1), prop.table(table(occ_f, occ), 1))
248 mobility.samesex.daughter <- with(filter(psid , sex ==2), prop.table(table(occ_m, occ), 1))
249
250 mobility.samesex.son <- matrix(rep(mobility.samesex.son ,each =5), ncol =5)
251 mobility.samesex.daughter <- matrix(rep(t(mobility.samesex.daughter) ,5) , ncol=5, byrow=TRUE
)
252
253 mobility .2sex.son <- with(filter(psid , sex ==1), ftable(prop.table(table(occ_f, occ_m, occ),
c(1,2))))
254 mobility .2sex.daughter <- with(filter(psid , sex ==2), ftable(prop.table(table(occ_f, occ_m,
occ), c(1,2))))
255
256 mobility.perfect <- diag(rep(1, 5))
257 mobility.perfect.son <- matrix(rep(mobility.perfect ,each =5), ncol =5)
258 mobility.perfect.daughter <- matrix(rep(t(mobility.perfect) ,5) , ncol=5, byrow=TRUE)
259
260 N.male.0 <- apply(with(psid , table(occ_f, occ_m)), 1, sum)
261 N.female .0 <- apply(with(psid , table(occ_f, occ_m)), 2, sum)
262
263 mu.0 <- with(psid , table(occ_f, occ_m))
264 alpha <- matrix(rep(0, 25), 5, 5)
265 for (i in 1:5) for (j in 1:5) alpha[i,j] <- mu.0[i,j]*(N.male .0[i]+N.female .0[j])/(N.male .0[
i]*N.female .0[j])
266
267 random .0 <- matrix(rep(0,25), 5, 5)
268 for (i in 1:5) for (j in 1:5) random .0[i,j] <- N.male .0[i]*N.female .0[j]/sum(N.male .0)
269
270 endogamous .0 <- diag(pmin(N.male.0, N.female .0))
271
272
273 ######################## Table 7 ###########################
274 # Ratio Measures of Social Reproduction Effects Under
275 # Different Mating and Mobility Rules
276 ############################################################
277
278 mobility.list.son <- list(mobility.samesex.son , mobility .2sex.son , mobility.perfect.son)
279 mobility.list.daughter <- list(mobility.samesex.daughter , mobility .2sex.daughter , mobility.
perfect.daughter)
280
281 mating.list <- list(random.0, endogamous .0, mu.0)
282
283 TSRE.ratio <- rep(0,9)
284 TSRE.diff <- rep(0,9)
285
286 count = 1
287 for (x in 1:3) {
288 for (y in 1:3) {
289
290 new.mobility.son <- matrix(0, 25, 125)
291 new.mobility.daughter <- matrix(0, 25, 125)
292
293 for (i in 1:25) {
294 new.mobility.son[i, ((i-1)*5+1):(i*5)] <- mobility.list.son[[y]][i,]
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295 new.mobility.daughter[i, ((i-1)*5+1):(i*5)] <- mobility.list.daughter [[y]][i,]
296 }
297
298 G1.son <- t((as.vector(t(mating.list[[x]]))* GRR.son)) %*% new.mobility.son
299 G1.daughter <- t((as.vector(t(mating.list[[x]]))* GRR.daughter)) %*% new.mobility.
daughter
300
301 TSRE.ratio[count] <- (sum(G1.son[,1]+G1.daughter [,1])/(N.male .0[1]+N.female .0[1])/2)
/(sum(G1.son[,((7-1)*5+1)]+G1.daughter [,((7-1)*5+1)])/(N.male .0[2]+N.female
.0[2])/2)
302 TSRE.diff[count] <- (sum(G1.son[,1]+G1.daughter [,1])/(N.male .0[1]+N.female .0[1])/2)
-(sum(G1.son[,((7-1)*5+1)]+G1.daughter [,((7-1)*5+1)])/(N.male .0[2]+N.female
.0[2])/2)
303
304 count <- count + 1
305 }
306 }
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